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In this paper, I investigate whether participation in employee stock option 
exchange programs contains private information about future stock returns. High 
participation in employee stock option exchange programs is associated with negative 
future abnormal returns over the ensuing 12-month period. This association is moderated 
by the transparency of the firm’s information environment: high institutional ownership 
and high financial statement informativeness weaken the negative relation between 
participation and abnormal returns. Controlling for transparency of the firms’ information 
environment, the association between participation and future returns arises primarily 
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INTRODUCTION 
In this study, I investigate the relation between participation in employee stock 
option exchange programs and future stock returns.  Broad-based equity compensation is 
an important component of employee pay at many firms. A growing literature identifies a 
number of economic benefits to broad-based equity plans, including attraction and 
retention of the “right” employees, indexing compensation to the outside market, cash 
flow and tax benefits, and potential incentive effects (e.g., Bergman and Jenter 2007, 
Oyer and Schaefer 2005, Babenko and Tserlukevitch 2009, Hochberg and Lindsey 2010).   
Despite the importance of broad-based compensation, little is known about how 
broad-based compensation and private information might be related.1  Debate regarding 
employees’ subjective valuation of equity grants continues unabated (e.g., Huddart 1994, 
Bergman and Jenter 2007, Farrell et al. 2011); in particular, whether equity plans allow 
employees to benefit at the expense of shareholders remains an open question.  For 
example, prior research demonstrates that executives reveal private information through 
their purchases and sales of company shares, stock option exercises, and hedging 
transactions (e.g., Bartov and Mohanram 2004, Aboody et al. 2007, Seyhun 1992, 
Lakonishok and Lee 2001, Jagolinzer et al. 2007, Bettis et al. 2013). 
Although various equity transactions by executives have been associated with 
subsequent stock price movements, it is unclear whether similar conclusions can be 
drawn for broad-based equity programs and private information.  While a limited amount 
of research suggests that employee participants in broad-based equity plans do have 
                                                 
1
 In this paper, private information is defined as information that is both unknown to the market and 
sufficiently material to influence the firm’s stock price upon being revealed.  
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private information that manifests itself in their decisions related to equity awards, such 
research concentrates on steady-state, recurring transactions such as option exercises 
(e.g., Huddart and Lang 2003).  My focus in this paper is on participation in employee 
stock option exchange programs, which are relatively rare recontracting opportunities 
that are presented to employees after periods of significant share price decline.   
Stock option exchange programs are the modern analog of option repricings, and 
as such, any analysis of exchange programs builds upon an extensive repricing literature.  
Prior research on option repricing has addressed its optimality as a recontracting device, 
incentive and retention effects, associated firm characteristics (including governance 
characteristics), implications for subsequent performance, alternative methods of 
resetting incentives, and related issues (see, for example, Saly 1994, Acharya et al. 2000, 
Chidhambaran and Prabhala 2003, Aboody et al. 2010, Chen 2004,  and Kalpathy 2009). 
With few exceptions (e.g., Larcker et al. 2012, Ferri 2005, Coles et al. 2006), 
most research on option recontracting has been framed in terms of traditional, or 
unilateral, repricings.  Traditional repricings are characterized by a unilateral decision by 
the employer to reduce the exercise price of outstanding underwater options without 
changing any other option terms.  Employees whose options are repriced know ex ante 
that they will never realize a payout worse under the new options than would have been 
realized under the old options, irrespective of the firm’s stock price trajectory.  From the 
employees’ perspective, traditional repricings create only benefits: the new options will 
always be at least as preferred as the old options, and they will be strictly preferred to the 
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old options by employees who anticipate remaining employed by the firm through any 
remaining vesting period.  
Employees’ preferences under stock option exchange programs are less clear 
because, unlike traditional repricings, exchange programs create both benefits and costs 
to employees.  In return for a lowered payout hurdle, a participating employee must 
accept costly award modifications such as a lower overall fair value (resulting in fewer 
instruments), reduced optionality/“upside,” or a longer vesting period, generally in 
combination.  Participants could be either better or worse off under the new award terms 
depending on the firm’s stock price performance.  Employers are therefore required to 
present employees with the choice of whether to participate, and eligible employees must 
assess whether accepting new award features that are economically costly is worth the 
benefit of a lowered payout hurdle.  As a simple example, an employee who anticipates 
that the firm’s stock price will fully recover from the negative shock and continue to 
grow will prefer having more options with a higher exercise price to fewer options with a 
lower exercise price and thus will abstain from an exchange that reduces the number of 
the employees’ options. The reverse is true for an employee who anticipates that the 
firm’s stock price will perform poorly. To an employee whose information about the 
business supports a positive outlook, reduced upside potential is perceived as very costly; 
to an employee whose information supports a negative outlook, it is perceived as costless.  
The cost-benefit assessments of both employees will be reflected in their decisions 
regarding whether to participate in or abstain from the exchange.  The participation 
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rate—the percentage of eligible options tendered in the exchange—thus serves as a 
barometer of employees’ collective sentiment regarding the firm’s future prospects.  
 If employees make their participation decisions based on valuable information 
that is unknown to the rest of the market, then participation will be negatively associated 
with future abnormal returns.  Given that exchange programs are offered after protracted 
share price declines and may be accompanied by considerable uncertainty2 regarding the 
future stock price, this setting allows a more convincing test for the existence of private 
information than the less turbulent settings examined in previous studies (Huddart and 
Lang 2003; Babenko and Sen 2012).  To the extent that employees do possess private 
information, its predictive value for stock returns is likely contingent on the transparency 
of the information environment. I expect that in a transparent information environment 
characterized by informative financial statements and shaped by the information 
gathering and processing activities of sophisticated market participants, employees are 
less likely to have an information advantage over outsiders. 
To address my research question, I use a sample of exchange events collected 
from tender offer communications and initial and amended tender offer statements filed 
with the Securities and Exchange Commission by firms that offered employee stock 
option exchange programs during the five-year period from 2006 to 2010. I regress 
abnormal returns on participation and employ institutional ownership and financial 
statement informativeness as proxies for transparency of the firm’s information 
environment. I find that participation has a negative association with future abnormal 
                                                 
2
 Uncertainty (used here in the Knightian sense) denotes situations in which the distribution of possible 
outcomes cannot be ascertained given available information; in contrast, risk indicates that the distribution 
of possible outcomes can be reasonably estimated using historical and/or other data (Knight 1921).  
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returns, and the negative association is weaker for firms with high institutional 
ownership.  
In subsequent analysis, I split the sample into two groups according to whether 
the CEO was included as an eligible participant and re-perform the analysis on both 
samples. A comparison of the coefficients across groups shows that the negative relation 
between participation and future abnormal returns comes primarily from firms that 
include the CEO among the eligible participants.  As hypothesized, the relation is weaker 
for firms that have high institutional ownership and high financial statement 
informativeness. Taken together, these results suggest that participation does embed 
private information about future stock returns, the transparency of a firm’s information 
environment moderates the degree to which participation is informative, and participation 
in exchanges that include the CEO among eligible participants is more informative than 
participation in exchanges that exclude the CEO. 
This paper contributes to the literature on stock option repricing, broad-based 
equity compensation, and the link between private information and compensation.  First, 
utilizing a hand-collected dataset containing the details of exchanges under ASC 718 
(SFAS 123R), I am able to exploit institutional features of the new regulatory regime and 
the availability of participation data to study the information implications of broad-based 
option recontracting programs. To my knowledge, this study is the first to do so in the 
modern stock option exchange setting.  Second, I show that, under certain conditions, 
employees may have an information advantage over outside investors after a period of 
stock price underperformance.   
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 summarizes 
literature and develops the theory and hypotheses; Section 3 describes the institutional 
environment, sample selection procedures, and measures; Section 4 reports the various 
analyses; and Section 5 concludes.  
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LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
2.1 Broad-Based Options, Stock Option Recontracting, and Private Information 
Broad-based equity compensation plans are popular mechanisms for 
compensating employees.3  Firms’ public filings and compensation/HR industry 
documents frequently cite employee motivation, attraction/retention, and alignment of 
incentives with shareholders as fundamental reasons to administer broad-based option 
plans.4 While many facets of equity compensation have been explored in an extensive 
body of academic research, the information implications of broad-based equity 
compensation have received limited treatment. This section contains a brief overview of 
broad-based options, stock option recontracting, and private information in order to 
provide context and motivation for the hypotheses that follow. 
2.1.1 Broad-Based Options 
Empirical research on broad-based equity plans suggests that attraction and 
retention of employees motivates the use of option compensation programs. Balsam and 
Miharjo (2007) find that in-the-money awards serve to retain rank-and-file employees.  
Rank-and-file option grants are used heavily among firms that operate in highly 
competitive labor markets and are less able to rely on the legal system to protect trade 
secrets (Ittner et al. 2003; Kedia and Rajgopal 2009; Erkens 2011). Additionally, firms 
use rank-and-file option grants as a mechanism that indexes employee compensation to 
reflect labor market opportunities and draws optimistic workers to the firm (Oyer 2004; 
Oyer and Schaefer 2005; Bergman and Jenter 2007).  From a liquidity perspective, broad-
                                                 
3
 I define broad-based equity compensation plans as those that include non-executive employees. 
4
 See Appendix A for an example of firm communication to shareholders. 
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based option plans may provide additional benefits to grantor firms by improving cash 
flows and providing pro-cyclical tax benefits (Core and Guay 2001; Bergman and Jenter 
2007; Babenko and Tserlukevitch 2009).   
Studies on the incentive effects of broad-based options reach mixed conclusions: 
while limited evidence points to increased effort and motivation (Hochberg and Lindsey 
2010), other evidence suggests that the risk of free riding dominates any potential 
incentive effects (e.g., Core and Guay 2001; Oyer and Schaefer 2005).  Complicating 
matters is the fact that employees’ subjective valuation of their options can deviate 
substantially from theoretical values (Lambert and Larcker 2001, as quoted in 
Knowledge@Wharton 2001; Hodge et al. 2009; Farrell et al. 2011; Ingersoll 2006).  
Although a firm can earn rents by granting options when employees overvalue them 
(Bergman and Jenter 2007), it must also contend with the possibility of employees 
substantially undervaluing their awards through reliance on heuristics or other non-
economic factors (Hodge et al. 2009; Farrell et al. 2011).    
When a firm experiences a severe, negative stock price decline, sending 
compensatory options out-of-the money (or “underwater”), employees’ subjective 
valuations can become particularly relevant to employee and employer decision-making. 
Underwater options present employer firms with several dilemmas.  First, options for 
which the strike price exceeds the current market price have extremely low delta5, which 
                                                 
5
 Option delta refers to the ratio of the change in the value of the option to the change in the price of the 
underlying and thus serves as one measure of an option’s incentive effects.  The standard Black-Scholes-
Merton (BSM) delta for a simple, non-dividend-paying European call option can be approximated as N(d1), 
where N(·) refers to the standard normal cumulative distribution function, d  lnS0/X    r 
 σ2/2T/σ√T, S0 is the price of the underlying, X is the exercise price of the option, r is the continuously 
compounded risk-free interest rate, σ is the annualized standard deviation of continuously compounded 
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diminishes the potential incentive effects of the awards (e.g., Hall and Knox 2004). 
Second, the subjective value of underwater options to employees may be significantly 
lower than the objective fair value, and the difference between subjective and objective 
option values may become more negative as options go further out of the money.6 To the 
extent this is the case,  the weakening of the options’ attraction and retention effects 
comes at the worst possible time—after a period of stock price underperformance, when 
significant focus and commitment from employees may be necessary for the firm to 
regroup. Third, even if underwater options are viewed as worthless by their recipients, 
they still count against share plan restrictions and thus may constrain a firm’s ability to 
grant additional awards.  Finally, current accounting rules (SFAS 123R/ASC 718) require 
the fair value of an option for amortization purposes to be determined at the grant date; 
subsequent fluctuations in value have no effect on the amount expensed.  Firms with 
underwater options thus recognize expense on the financial statements period after period 
for those options irrespective of whether the firm is currently realizing benefits from the 
old awards.  As discussed below, modifying the terms of outstanding options 
(“recontracting”) may provide one channel for management to address these issues. 
2.1.2 Stock Option Recontracting 
Stock option recontracting offers the potential to resolve some or all of the 
difficulties triggered by underwater awards: depending on the specific features of the 
                                                                                                                                                 
stock returns, and T is the option’s life (see, for example, Chance 2004). In the case of a tradable, non-
dividend-paying European call, the option holder’s exercise strategy (i.e., “do not exercise before 
expiration”) is clear ex ante.  As employees who are granted stock options tend to exercise them early, an 
employee stock option’s actual life can itself be a model output (e.g., Bettis et al. 2005).  For convenience, 
compensation researchers often use the formula above with a rough estimate of T when obtaining a precise 
estimate of delta is not the goal of the study.  
6
 Table 4 in Ingersoll (2006) provides a numerical example. 
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arrangement, recontracting may restore delta, enhance subjective value (and therefore 
attraction/retention effects), recapture shares for the option plan, and, due to accounting 
rules for modifications under ASC 718, obtain some “use” from reported stock option 
expense as some or all of the cost is captured in the current expense schedule.  
Recontracting presents a different set of concerns for shareholders, however; shareholder 
advocates and members of the investment community argue that option recontracting, 
and option repricing in particular, may give employees an unfair advantage over outside 
owners.  Unlike employees, shareholders cannot have their equity modified to cushion 
the effects of stock price declines. Given that recontracting lowers the bar for realizing a 
positive dollar amount from the awards than originally agreed upon, recontracting can be 
perceived as a form of agency-induced expropriation that severs the link between 
employee performance and compensation. 
Analytical work by Acharya et al. (2000) supplies a useful framework for 
organizing the competing considerations inherent in option recontracting.  Their model, 
which is set in a two-party principal-agent framework, suggests that some degree of 
recontracting is generally optimal, but the level of its desirability is contingent on the 
manager’s degree of control over the returns distribution, the cost of replacing the 
manager, and the extent to which the manager can manipulate the process.  Empirical 
studies on repricings have largely borne out these predictions: smaller firms operating in 
highly competitive labor markets are more likely to reprice (Chidambaran and Prabhala 
2003; Carter and Lynch 2004; Kalpathy 2009).  Aboody et al. (2010) find that repricing 
effectively resets incentives for executives but not rank-and-file employees.  
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Empirical studies testing whether agency conflicts influence repricing come to 
varying conclusions.  While early work suggests that agency conflicts play a role in the 
decision to reprice (e.g., Chance et al. 2000), results from later studies that employ more 
robust methods do not appear to support this hypothesis (Chidambaran and Prabhala 
2003; Kalpathy 2009). Evidence does not support managerial entrenchment as a 
motivation for repricing—Chidambaran and Prabhala (2003) find that repricing firms 
have greater executive turnover than non-repricing firms, and Carter and Lynch (2004) 
find that repricing reduces rank-and-file turnover but not executive turnover.  However, 
Callahan et al. (2004) suggest that repricings involving CEOs may be timed to take 
advantage of earnings releases, and Ferri (2005) notes that when CEO options are 
repriced, subsequent short-term stock price movements are more favorable.  Both 
Callahan et al. (2004) and Ferri (2005) employ data from time periods in which timely 
disclosure of option recontracting events was not required.  However, Grein et al. (2005) 
find the opposite in a setting with immediate disclosure (Canada). Thus, they conclude 
that repricing has positive welfare effects. 
The structure of option recontracting initiatives over time reflects evolving 
regulatory mandates and institutional pressures, which are described in Ferri (2005) and 
Larcker et al. (2012).  As many empirical papers on option recontracting use relatively 
old data, extant research on stock option recontracting concentrates primarily on the most 
prevalent method of option recontracting during that timeframe: traditional, unilateral 
option repricings in which the only modification to the original award is a lower exercise 
price. A smaller subset of academic papers address 6 & 1 exchanges, which were pre-
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ASC 718 option exchanges that had an unusual timing feature: employees who chose to 
participate in the exchange received their new options at least six months after the old 
options were cancelled (Carter et al. 2003; Balachandran et al. 2004; Coles et al. 2006; 
Zamora 2008). Waiting at least six months (“six months and a day”) to provide 
employees with the new awards allowed recontracting firms to avoid recognizing 
compensation expense under FIN 44.   
Lee (2009) examines a sample of 6 & 1 exchange programs that straddles the 
bursting of the technology bubble and concludes that employees processed multi-
dimensional information about 6 & 1 programs in a sophisticated fashion, but the market 
fully anticipated employees’ participation decisions despite their complexity. In a similar 
vein, Coles et al. (2006) identify another area in which the market fully captures 
information relevant to 6 & 1 exchanges.  Specifically, they examine accruals activity 
during the six-month time lag between the cancellation of old options and the granting of 
new options under the FIN 44 regime, as the lag created perverse incentives for managers 
to temporarily manipulate the stock price downward to secure lower exercise prices.  
They find evidence that the earnings of 6 & 1 exchange firms were indeed managed 
downward during the six-month window, but these attempts were not successful because 
the market “saw through” the manipulation of accruals.   
Incorporating a six-month delay to issue replacement awards during an exchange 
became obsolete by 2006 (when SFAS 123R/ASC 718 took full effect), as the maneuver 
no longer served to evade expense recognition. Nevertheless, the new expensing and 
modification accounting requirements, the constriction of board power due to NYSE and 
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NASDAQ rules, and the heightened role of proxy advisors in the wake of SEC 
regulations have rendered option exchanges the most prevalent form of recontracting in 
recent years (Larcker et al. 2012).   
To date, few option recontracting papers have incorporated structural features 
associated with exchanges. Acharya et al. (2000), Ferri (2005), Lee (2009) and Larcker et 
al. (2012) are exceptions because their analyses in some way incorporate the potential for 
employee sacrifice. Acharya et al. (2000) allows for the possibility that underwater 
options will be replaced with a different number of new options. Ferri (2005) examines 
cross-sectional structural features of programs held in 1997, providing rich descriptive 
statistics for the pre-FIN 44 period.  Lee (2009) constructs a descriptive model of 
participation in 6 & 1 exchanges that occur during a four-year period starting in 
December 1998, noting that employees prefer instruments with more favorable 
characteristics.  Finally, Larcker et al. (2012) evaluate the worth of proxy advisor 
recommendations using the modern exchanges setting by testing the market’s reaction to 
program restrictions.  To my knowledge, no papers to date fully exploit the modern 
employee stock option exchange setting to formulate and test hypotheses concerning 
private information. Extant research on private information and firm employees is 
discussed in the next section. 
2.1.3 Private Information and Firm Employees 
A significant body of literature demonstrates that executives have valuable, 
nonpublic information about the prospects of their firms that is conveyed through both 
their open-market and off-market transactions under various conditions (e.g., Jaffe 1974, 
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Seyhun 1992, Bettis et al. 1997, Lakonishok and Lee 2001, and Jagolinzer et al. 2007). 
Studies examining decisions specifically related to executives’ equity compensation 
instruments come to similar conclusions.  Executives’ stock option exercises predict 
future earnings reversals that analysts do not anticipate (Bartov and Mohanram 2004), 
and executives’ decisions to exercise, exercise and hold, or exercise and sell have 
implications for future stock returns (Huddart and Lang 2003; Aboody et al. 2007). 
Although a degree of consensus exists in the literature regarding executives and 
the private information their compensation-related transactions reveal, whether and under 
what conditions non-executive employees’ transactions reveal private information has 
received little attention (Babenko and Sen 2012).  Data restrictions have likely played a 
role in the limited empirical evidence regarding non-executive employees and private 
information.  In the United States, only the executive officers (together with directors and 
owners of more than 10% of the firm’s shares) are classified as Section 16 insiders who 
are required to disclose details of their transactions in the firm’s shares and related 
derivatives.  
Despite limited data availability, several studies address the question of employee 
private information in various equity program contexts and obtain mixed results 
regarding the degree to which private information is distributed within equity-granting 
firms.  Core and Guay (2001) and Huddart and Lang (2003) both examine non-executive 
employee stock option exercises; however, Core and Guay (2001) find no evidence of 
private information among non-executives, while Huddart and Lang (2003) find that non-
executives’ exercises are just as informative for future returns as those of executives. 
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After accounting for various program features, Lee (2009) concludes that employee 
participation in 6 & 1 exchanges does not contain any information that has not already 
been anticipated by the market. More recently, Babenko and Sen (2012) find that strong 
employee participation in employee stock purchase plans is associated with positive 
future abnormal returns.  Both Huddart and Lang (2003) and Babenko and Sen (2012) 
use data generated for ongoing decisions under relatively normal conditions.  It is 
plausible that turbulence may cause changes to the information distribution within a firm 
and/or the extent to which information held by employees is useful for predicting future 
performance, rendering prior research findings inapplicable under more severe 
conditions.  Samples of 6 & 1 exchanges, such as the one used in Lee (2009), cannot 
readily be used to study information effects because the six-month time lag between the 
cancellation of the old options and issuance of new options presents opportunities to 
influence the value of the replacement awards and firm performance simultaneously.  In 
contrast to 6 & 1 exchanges, modern stock option exchanges are discrete events that are 
suitable for the analysis that follows. 
2.2 The Potential Links between Exchange Participation and Private Information 
2.2.1 Participation and Private Information 
The question of whether employees collectively have an information advantage 
over outside investors has implications for valuation, internal governance, and regulation.  
Employer firms estimating the cost of equity programs do not currently build explicit 
estimates of employee information advantage into their models. To the extent that such 
an advantage exists, failing to incorporate the associated costs may bias the firm’s 
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estimates downward (Huddart and Lang 2003; Babenko and Sen 2012). Additionally, 
such firms maintain detailed records of employee award transactions to facilitate HR, 
reporting, and tax requirements.  If employees do possess private information, performing 
regular analyses of the data may yield valuable insights for improving control and 
retention systems—particularly in operationally diverse and/or geographically distributed 
firms (e.g., Babenko and Sen 2012, Jensen and Meckling 1995).  Finally, current 
regulations do not require non-executive officers to report transactions in company 
securities.7  If employees who are not required to report their trades in company securities 
are consistently shown to be transacting based on private information, regulators might 
have cause to re-evaluate the consistency of current reporting requirements.   
Employee stock option exchanges provide an excellent setting for examining 
private information held by employees under turbulent conditions. Unilaterally lowering 
the exercise price of the underwater options while holding all other terms constant, as 
done in a traditional option repricing, does not require employee consent because the 
employee is better off under all states of nature having received an equal number of new 
awards with a lower exercise price.  In contrast, an employee who participates in a stock 
option exchange is generally better off for having participated if the stock price does not 
rebound “too much” or “too quickly.”  In return for replacement compensation that has a 
higher anticipated probability of payout, the employee must accept sacrificial award 
features, such as lengthened vesting, a reduction in upside potential due to a reduced 
number of replacement options, and/or a complete loss of optionality as the underwater 
                                                 
7
 Section 16 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 generally requires executive officers, directors, 
and owners of more than 10% of a firm’s shares (commonly referred to as “Section 16 insiders”) to report 
their transactions in the firm’s securities to the SEC on Form 4 within 2 business days of execution. 
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options are replaced with a relatively small quantity of restricted stock units or a cash 
payout based on the underwater options’ (now miniscule) fair value. Thus, the 
replacement compensation only exceeds the old options in attractiveness to the extent the 
employee possesses information that suggests that subsequent increases in the stock price 
over the remaining life of the options will be muted.  The cost-benefit tradeoff is reflected 
in firms’ communications with employees, which state explicitly that participation may 
result in a worse outcome and at times, even provide tools for employees to construct 
their own quantitative forecasts (see “Risks that are Specific to this Offer” in Appendix B 
and the breakeven calculator in Figure 1 for examples). 
In choosing whether to participate in the exchange or abstain, employees reveal 
their outlook about future firm performance: a higher participation rate indicates that 
employees anticipate lackluster future performance.  If employees’ decisions in the 
aggregate reflect private information, the participation rate will be associated with the 
firm’s future returns.  The first hypothesis is therefore stated as follows. 
H1: The relation between participation and abnormal returns is negative. 
 
My primary hypothesis rests on the assumption that any private information held 
by employees will become at least partially impounded into the stock price during the 
subsequent period under examination.  In this sense, H1 is a joint hypothesis that 
employees have private information and that the private information they hold will 
influence returns by the end of the longest window tested.  To the extent that employees 
hold private information about the firm’s prospects that is not eventually reflected in 
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prices as a result of either public disclosure or informed trading during the period 
examined, there is a bias against finding any support for H1.  
2.2.2 Transparency of the Information Environment 
I anticipate that the relation between participation and abnormal returns will be 
affected by the transparency of the firm’s information environment. I define a transparent 
information environment as one in which the combination of publicly available 
information and costly information production activities by sophisticated market 
participants result in more informative stock prices as information is either disseminated 
to the investing public (in the case of financial statements) or impounded directly into 
returns through trades (in the case of institutional ownership). When an exchange firm’s 
information environment is relatively transparent, I expect that its employees will have 
less of an information advantage over other market participants and vice versa.  This 
reasoning suggests the following umbrella hypothesis: 
H2: Transparency of the information environment weakens the relation between 
participation and abnormal returns. 
 
For my main tests, I employ two proxies to capture transparency of the firm’s 
information environment: institutional ownership and financial statement 
informativeness, as measured by the R2 of the regression of price on earnings and book 
value for an individual firm.  In supplemental analyses, I discuss alternative proxies such 
as analyst following and size.    
First, prior research suggests that higher institutional ownership causes stock 
prices to be more informative with respect to both future earnings and non-earnings 
information due to institutional investors’ advanced information gathering and processing 
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activities and access to other sources of private information (e.g., Jiambalvo et al. 2002, 
Bushman et al. 2010).  Additionally, institutional ownership has been associated with 
tighter monitoring and stronger governance pressures (e.g., Chung and Zhang 2011, 
Larcker et al. 2012).  I use the percentage of institutional ownership as a proxy for the 
extent to which the firm is subject to the monitoring and information production activities 
of a sophisticated ownership base and anticipate that higher institutional ownership will 
lead participation to be less informative. 
H2A: Higher institutional ownership weakens the relation between participation and 
abnormal returns. 
 
Second, the quality of a firm’s financial statements comprises an important 
component of the information environment.  The R2 from a regression of price on 
earnings and book value serves as a proxy for financial statement informativeness, or 
value relevance (Frankel and Li 2004).  In addition to reflecting the extent to which 
financial statement values themselves are associated with price, the R2 measure 
summarizes the extent to which other information that influences price is subsumed by 
financial statement data (Francis and Schipper 1999). I anticipate that a higher R2 will 
result in a less informative participation rate. 
H2B: Higher financial statement informativeness weakens the relation between 





INSTITUTIONAL DETAILS, SAMPLE SELECTION, AND MEASURES 
3.1 Institutional Details for Employee Stock Option Exchanges 
Employers wishing to implement an employee stock option exchange program 
consider multiple issues in selecting an exchange structure before executing the 
program.8  Broadly speaking, the firm must balance the goal of constructing a package 
that is appealing to participants—thus satisfying retention objectives—with the need to 
maintain positive shareholder relations.  With these competing objectives in mind, the 
firm selects the type of replacement compensation that will be used (options, restricted 
stock, restricted stock units, or cash), which out-of-the-money options will be eligible for 
exchange, and which employees and directors will be eligible to participate. Further, the 
firm assesses whether recognizing incremental expense on the financial statements is 
acceptable or if no additional expense should be recognized, as financial statement 
constraints can limit design choices.  If recognizing additional compensation expense in 
connection with the exchange is not perceived as a viable path forward, the firm may 
undertake a value-for-value exchange, which constrains the fair value of the replacement 
compensation to be no greater than the fair value of the underwater options relinquished 
as of the exchange date.  The more out-of-the-money the old options become, the more 
their fair value declines, resulting in a less attractive exchange package. Said differently, 
in a value-for-value exchange, the number of old options required to obtain one new 
option or other unit of replacement compensation (“the exchange ratio”) will be higher 
when the old options are extremely underwater. 
                                                 
8
 Client bulletins such as “Repricing Underwater Stock Options” by White & Case LLP (October 2008) and 
“Underwater Stock Options and Stock Option Exchange Programs” by Shearman & Sterling LLP (April 2, 
2009) summarize issues for publicly traded firms to consider. 
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If the firm trades on the NYSE or Nasdaq exchange and the original equity 
incentive plan documents do not explicitly specify that option repricing or exchange 
programs are authorized under the plan, the firm must obtain shareholder approval in 
order to undertake an exchange program if the replacement compensation involves equity 
instruments.9  The degree of influence that the shareholder approval process exerts on the 
exchange program depends on the nature of the shareholder base.  If shares are 
concentrated among “friendly” owners, management, and/or the board, then the firm will 
face fewer constraints in structuring the exchange.  If, however, ownership is 
concentrated among institutions reliant on proxy advisors, the terms of the exchange will 
likely be heavily influenced by the policies of those advisors.  This is particularly true for 
Institutional Shareholder Services, the largest of the advisors, as ISS policy is to 
recommend that votes be withheld from directors who approve exchanges that are not put 
to a shareholder vote (see Larcker et al. 2012 for further discussion of ISS).  Value-for-
value exchanges are highly favored by ISS and some shareholder advocates, which may 
lead to the adoption of this structure in order to obtain shareholder approval.  Proxy 
solicitors may be engaged by the firm to assess the receptiveness of major shareholders to 
an exchange and to the proposed plan terms, and forecast shareholder votes under 
different scenarios. 
If shareholder approval is necessary, the firm may either put forth the proposal for 
a vote at the annual meeting or call a special meeting.  The firm must file a preliminary 
                                                 
9
 Per SEC Release No. 34-48108, dated June 30, 2003. This rule also stopped brokers from voting shares 
held in street name in the absence of client instructions when the proposals concern equity plan adoptions 
or material amendments, with limited exceptions.  Thus, for stock option recontracting, the handling of 
broker non-votes was consistent prior to the more recent and comprehensive restrictions on broker votes 
imposed by the Dodd-Frank Act and NYSE Rule 452 amendments. 
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proxy statement (PRE 14A) with the SEC for review 10 days prior to sending the final 
proxy statement to shareholders and filing the final proxy statement (DEF 14A) with the 
SEC.  Given that stock prices can be highly volatile and the time that elapses between the 
planning of the exchange and obtaining shareholder approval might bring improvements 
in the stock price (or conversely, further declines that render the exchange ratio under a 
value-for-value exchange too high), firms with option plans requiring shareholder 
approval often note in their filings and in communication with employees that the 
exchange might not be conducted even if approval is granted.10 
Regardless of whether shareholder approval is sought, communication regarding 
an exchange or proposed exchange is filed with the SEC on Form TO-C and includes 
such items as public announcements, e-mails alerting employees to the proposed 
exchange, and slide decks from presentations explaining the program to employees.  At 
the commencement of the exchange, the firm files Form TO-I formally detailing the 
initial tender offer terms.  The tender offer must remain open to eligible employees for at 
least 20 business days. The SEC staff may review the tender offer and require 
amendments to clarify aspects of the exchange, which would be filed by the company on 
an amended tender offer statement (Form SC TO-I/A).  Finally, when the window closes, 
the company is required to file an amended tender offer statement (also Form SC TO-
I/A), which discloses the participation rate.  Exchange participants who are executives or 
directors are required to file details regarding the options surrendered and replacement 
                                                 
10
 The time between the date on which the final proxy statement is available and the shareholder meeting 
date depends on the method used to distribute meeting materials, applicable state law, and the anticipated 
time necessary to complete the proxy solicitation process.   
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compensation obtained on Form 4 within two days of the options being accepted by the 
firm.   
3.2 Sample of Exchange Events 
My sample consists of employee stock option exchanges that occur between 2006 
and 2010.  The initial year of the sample, 2006, is the first year in which all publicly 
traded firms were required to implement ASC 718 (SFAS 123R).11 The standard requires 
that firms measure the fair value of stock option compensation as of the grant date and 
amortize that value over an employee’s service period.  It also provides a consistent 
modification accounting framework that influences firms’ decisions regarding option 
recontracting programs.  In addition to a stable accounting regime, this sample timeframe 
provides the ability to examine modern recontracting features while preserving my ability 
to examine subsequent returns over a longer window. The sample selection process is 
summarized in Table 1, Panel A. 
Using the SEC’s EDGAR website, I first extract all Form SC TO-C filings filed 
between January 1, 2006 and December 31, 2010. The vast majority of these filings relate 
to more common transactions such as mergers and acquisitions, share repurchases, and 
redemption or conversion of various debt and equity instruments. From this pool of 1,882 
documents, I eliminate non-exchange tender offers (1,487), and exchanges made to 
correct the negative tax effects of backdated stock options (40) because the purpose and 
motivation of these exchanges is fundamentally different from those of a standard 
employee stock option exchange. This results in an intermediate count of 355 tender offer 
                                                 
11
 On April 14, 2005, the SEC delayed the original implementation timeline for publicly traded firms from 
the first interim period beginning after June 15, 2005 to the first full-year period beginning after June 15, 
2005.  
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communication documents.  I then note that 201 of these documents are follow-up 
communications that refer to exchanges that are already included in the count.  
Eliminating these supplemental filings results in an intermediate count of 154 documents. 
Next I extract all Form SC TO-I (6,737) and Form SC TO-I/A (4,294) documents 
filed during the same timeframe to seek matches for the subsample of Form SC TO-C 
documents and eliminate one exchange that was not completed. Noting that the SC TO-C 
forms do not always contain the terms necessary to flag the right documents for further 
inspection (creating the possibility of “lost” observations), I screen the remaining SC TO-
I and SC TO-I/A forms for relevant terms using the same procedures used for the SC TO-
C documents and identify an additional 105 completed exchange events for a total of 258 
unique exchanges.12 This sample is comparable to the sample of 264 exchange 
observations reported in the Larcker et al. (2012) study of proxy advisor 
recommendations, which covers a partially overlapping time period (2004 to 2009). 
For these 258 events, I attempt to use the disclosed CUSIP and CIK codes 
obtained directly from SEC filings to obtain PERMNOs for merging data with CRSP.  
However, I find that over one quarter of the firms’ disclosed codes require searches 
through other databases besides CRSP to obtain valid matches and some are not covered 
at all by CRSP.  After constructing the variables described in subsequent sections from 
the CRSP Monthly Stock, Monthly Stock Event, Delisting and Daily Stock files; the 
                                                 
12These steps are accomplished by first extracting all tender offer filings using publicly available PERL 
code authored by Andrew Leone (http://sbaleone.bus.miami.edu/PERLCOURSE/Perl_Resources.html) to 
download the filings and a commercially prepared script to flag potential exchanges, thereby narrowing the 
search to the most relevant documents to facilitate visual inspection and hand collection. Documents 
flagged for inspection contain phrases such as “offer to exchange,” “value-for-value,” “eligible option,” 
“eligible employee,” “scholes” and “vesting.” 
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I/B/E/S Summary History file and Internet Wayback Machine archives; the Compustat 
Fundamentals Annual file; and the Thomson Reuters Institutional Holdings 13F Database 
and merging the data with the SEC data, 209 usable observations remain for the primary 
analyses. 
Table 1, Panel B summarizes the terms of the exchange programs that are 
presented to employees.  Well over half of all exchanges (65.6%) have a value-for-value 
structure, which constrains the fair value of the replacement compensation to be no 
greater than the fair value of the old, out-of-the-money options as measured at the time of 
the exchange.  Options are the most common form of replacement compensation, offered 
in 64.9% of exchanges during the period, with the remainder of the exchanges offering 
restricted stock or cash.  The majority of exchanges attach additional vesting time to the 
replacement compensation (73.7%).13 The percentages of the sample offering value-for-
value terms and requiring additional vesting time are similar to those reported by Larcker 
et al. (2012).  As seen in Panel C, Healthcare, Medical Equipment and Pharmaceutical 
Products (13.3%), Personal and Business Services (14.3%) and Business Equipment 
(38.6%) are the industries with the largest concentrations of exchange firms.  The latter 
two industries include “high-tech” firms, which constitute a significant percentage of 
repricing firms in prior studies. 
Table 2 contains a summary of exchange firm characteristics alongside those of 
all Compustat firms reporting nonzero stock compensation expense during the 2006 to 
2010 period.  On average, exchange firms are smaller, less profitable, and less indebted 
                                                 
13
 Vesting extensions are distinct from extensions in an option’s time to expiration.  A vesting extension 
does not lengthen the time that an option is “alive” and thus does not increase an option’s value to the 
employee. 
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than their non-exchange counterparts.  Exchange firms also report weaker operating cash 
flows than firms in the general sample and lower R&D expense per dollar of revenue; 
moreover, exchange firms have lower Tobin’s Q.  Unsurprisingly, exchange firms have 
options that are more deeply out of the money.  
3.3 Description of Measures 
Testing for an association between employee stock option exchange participation 
and subsequent returns requires an intermediate- to long-run return measure for use as a 
dependent variable. Abnormal stock returns, ABRETM, is the firm’s characteristics-based 
buy-and-hold abnormal return calculated as in Daniel et al. (1997), using the method of 
delisting adjustments introduced in Beaver et al. (2007).14 The characteristics-based 
approach has the advantage of yielding higher power to detect abnormal returns and 
lower standard errors than would be available via factor models (Daniel et al. 1997) and 
does not impose the constraint of constant coefficients on factors across portfolios.  As I 
do not have an ex ante expectation of how long any private information contained in 
stock option exchange participation might take to be revealed to the market, I calculate 
abnormal returns over three windows that start the month following the end of the 
exchange initiation month and end six, nine, and 12 months later. 
Calculation of ABRETM proceeds as follows.  I first construct 125 value-weighted 
characteristics-based portfolios based on size, book-to-market ratio, and momentum 
groupings, following Daniel et al. (1997).  I then match my sample of exchange firms to 
                                                 
14
 The SAS file used to construct the delistings-adjusted benchmarks was adapted from code authored by 
Rabih Moussawi and Gjergji Cici at WRDS (http://wrds-
web.wharton.upenn.edu/wrds/research/applications/port/dgtw ) and integrated with code by Richard Price 
(http://richardp.bus.usu.edu/research/). 
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the appropriate benchmark portfolios and compute buy-and-hold abnormal returns for 
each window. To obtain the characteristics-based portfolio groupings, all NYSE, Nasdaq, 
and AMEX stocks are sorted into quintiles based on NYSE market capitalization 
breakpoints as of midyear.   Next, stocks within each of the size quintiles are sorted into 
quintiles based on the industry-adjusted book-to-market ratio as of the prior year end, 
resulting in 25 intermediate portfolio groupings.  The final 125 portfolios are obtained by 
sorting each of the intermediate portfolios into quintiles based on trailing 11-month 
momentum measured from July of the prior year to May of the current year (one month is 
omitted from the momentum computation to avoid the potential effect of month-to-month 
return reversals, as documented in Jegadeesh 1990).   
The Beaver et al. (2007) delisting adjustment algorithm provides a more refined 
way of using available information from comparable delisting events when a particular 
firm’s delisting return is missing.  When a delisted firm’s delisting return is available in 
CRSP, it is appropriately compounded with the delisted firm’s prior returns to obtain a 
cumulative return through the date of the delisting.  When a delisted firm’s delisting 
return is not available in CRSP, the average delisting return for delisting events of the 
same type is substituted in place of the firm’s actual delisting return.  Once the 
cumulative return through the delisting date is obtained (by either method), it is then 
reinvested in the appropriate size index decile portfolio.   
Additional measures used in the analysis are as follows. The exchange 
participation rate (PCT) is the percentage of eligible options that were exchanged as 
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disclosed in the amended tender offer statement after the exchange closes.15 Institutional 
ownership (IO) is the percentage of shares held by institutions as of the most recent 
quarter ended prior to exchange initiation, as reported on Form 13F and captured in the 
Thomson Reuters Institutional Holdings Database.  FRSQ is the R2 of the firm’s 
regression of the stock price one quarter after year end on the annual earnings and year-
end book value figures (Frankel and Li 2004).16 All data for R2 is taken from Compustat.  
FOLLOW is the natural logarithm of one plus the maximum number of analysts issuing 
quarterly estimates during the prior year (Frankel and Li 2004). Where available, these 
data are obtained from I/B/E/S.  For the 41 observations that are missing from I/B/E/S, I 
use the Internet Archive Wayback Machine (http://archive.org) to access archived 
Yahoo! Finance Analyst Estimates pages to obtain the maximum number of analysts 
issuing estimates for the firm during the closest available period. Analyst following is not 
available from either source in 14 cases and is therefore set to zero. NOCEO is an 
indicator variable set equal to 1 if the CEO is excluded from the exchange, and 0 
otherwise, as disclosed in the initial tender offer statement. 
3.4 Variable Descriptives 
Descriptive statistics and correlations for the variables are presented in Tables 2 
and 3.  On average, employees elect to exchange most of the options that the firm 
designates as eligible. Mean (median) participation is relatively high at 80.5% (85%), 
with an interquartile range of 0.716 to 0.949.  The Pearson correlations PCT-ABRET6, 
                                                 
15
 Interestingly, the number of employees eligible for the exchange is almost never disclosed, and the 
number of employees who actually participate is seldom disclosed. 
16
 For example, the regression model for a calendar-year firm is P3/31/t+1 = γ0 + γ1EPS12/31/t + γ2BVE12/31/t + ε.  
At least five observations must be available for the R2 value to be used in the sample. 
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PCT-ABRET9 and PCT-ABRET12 are negative, but are not statistically significant.  
Extreme performance appears to heavily influence the returns measures: ABRET6, 
ABRET9, and ABRET12 have large standard deviations and differences between mean 
and median values. The average buy-and-hold abnormal return for the 12-month window 
is 23.9%, but the median is negative 3.3%. 
Institutions hold 59.3% of the average sample firm’s outstanding shares.  The 
Pearson correlations between IO and each of the three returns measures are negative; 
only the correlation with ABRET12 has no statistical significance.  The mean FRSQ 
indicates that an average of 51% of the stock price can be explained by reported earnings 
and book values for firms in the sample, although a large interquartile range suggests 
variability among sample firms.  The average number of analysts issuing forecasts is 
8.79, and a standard deviation of 7.05 indicates a high degree of variability in the sample 
(raw figures not tabulated). Over half of sample firms (56%) bar the CEO from 
participating in the exchange.  NOCEO is negatively and significantly correlated with 
participation, and positively and significantly correlated with both institutional ownership 
and the FOLLOW variable.  Both Pearson and Spearman correlations between IO and 
FOLLOW are material and statistically significant.  FRSQ does not exhibit significant 
unconditional correlations with the other variables.  
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MODELS AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
4.1 Tests of the Association between Participation and Abnormal Returns 
The following linear regression model is used to test my hypotheses: 
 ABRETM  α0  α1PCT α2IO  α3PCT_IO  α4FRSQ  α5PCT_FRSQ ε 
The model expresses buy-and-hold abnormal returns as a function of participation and the 
information environment proxies. PCT_IO and PCT_FRSQ represent interactions 
between the individual transparency proxies and participation.  In keeping with the first 
two hypotheses, I expect a negative coefficient on PCT and positive coefficients on the 
interaction terms. 
Table 5 displays six-, nine- and 12-month regression results for the full sample.  
The estimates support the primary hypothesis that the participation rate is negatively 
associated with future abnormal returns (H1), and lend some support to the hypothesis 
that transparency weakens the association between participation and returns (H2).  The 
coefficient on PCT is negative and marginally significant in the six-month regression 
(p=0.061), and is negative and significant at conventional levels in the nine- and 12-
month regressions (p=0.022; p=0.048).  PCT_IO has positive and significant coefficients 
for all three time periods (the coefficient in the 12-month regression is marginally 
significant), but the coefficients on PCT_FRSQ are insignificant across regressions. 
Although I do not formulate expectations regarding the magnitude or direction of the 
information environment main effects, I note that institutional ownership, but not 
financial statement informativeness, has a significant main effect in the set of pooled 
regressions.  The negative relation between IO and abnormal returns may be explained in 
 31 
part by the high percentage (~40%) of microcap and nanocap firms in the sample, as 
institutions own a material percentage of shares for most of these sample firms.17  
Although such investments may allow institutional investors greater opportunities to 
exploit their comparative advantage in gathering and processing information, they may 
also be more speculative.   
The overall effect of participation in the models is economically material.  When 
the six-month model is evaluated using mean values for PCT and IO and a zero value for 
FRSQ, increasing participation by one standard deviation results in a 5.55 percentage 
point decline in buy-and-hold abnormal returns.18  Similarly, a one standard deviation 
increase in participation yields a 32.2 percentage point decline in the nine-month period, 
which fades to 6.6 percentage points in the 12-month period as additional information is 
incorporated into the stock price.  
4.2 The Implications of CEO Inclusion 
As discussed in section 2.1.3, a substantial body of research demonstrates that 
executives, and in particular the CEO, have private information about the firm’s future 
performance that is reflected in their decisions related to their equity compensation 
instruments.  To examine the effect of CEO inclusion, I separate exchanges into 
categories according to whether the CEO is an eligible participant. 
I use CEO eligibility rather than the eligibility of all executives and directors as 
the partitioning variable for two reasons.  First, the CEO eligibility partition facilitates 
                                                 
17
 Microcap (nanocap) stocks are those that have market capitalizations of less than $200 million ($50 
million). 
18
 FRSQ is evaluated at zero due to its lack of statistical significance, but using the mean value of FRSQ 
instead results in an estimated decline in abnormal returns of 23.18 percentage points in response to a one 
standard deviation increase in PCT for the six-month regression. 
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comparison with prior research that gives special attention to the role of the CEO in a 
variety of contexts.  Second, CEO eligibility is clearly identified across the sample, which 
renders it an ideal variable for test construction.  Some firms exclude various high-
ranking employees at the executive level who are not named executive officers while 
others do not, and some exclude certain executives or directors but not both. This 
heterogeneity among treatment of executives and directors does not lend itself to clean 
partitioning, unlike CEO eligibility. 
I partition the sample into two groups according to whether the CEO is eligible to 
participate in the exchange, then re-run the models on both samples to visually compare 
coefficients across the partition without three-way interaction terms.  Table 6 presents 
regression results for the subset of exchanges that include the CEO among eligible 
employees.  Consistent with the results of the full sample analysis, the coefficients on 
PCT are negative and significant across the six-, nine- and 12-month periods.  Further, 
the participation-institutional ownership interactions, PCT_IO, are significant in the six-
month window and marginally significant in the nine-month window. The PCT_FRSQ 
interactions are positive and marginally significant in the first two windows.  Table 7 
presents regression results for the subset of exchanges that exclude the CEO.  Neither 
participation nor the interaction terms are significant in the regressions for this 
subsample.  
To facilitate formal testing, I also employ a pooled model that includes a full set 
of NOCEO interaction terms (not tabulated).  The coefficients on PCT are statistically 
different across samples for the six-, nine- and 12-month periods (all p-values < 0.01).  
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The coefficients on PCT_FRSQ and NOCEO_PCT_FRSQ are marginally statistically 
different for the six- and nine-month windows (p-values of 0.058 and 0.055, 
respectively), but not the 12-month window, while the coefficients on PCT_IO and 
NOCEO_PCT_IO are statistically different for the six-month period only (p=0.060). The 
combined hypothesis that NOCEO_PCT, NOCEO_PCT_IO, and NOCEO_PCT_FRSQ 
are all zero is rejected across all periods, with p-values for the Wald test equal to 0.036 
for the three-month regression, 0.017 for the six-month regression, and 0.062 for the 12-
month regression.  In sum, results from the separate regressions and the CEO pooled 
interaction model suggest that the effect of participation is stronger for firms that include 
the CEO among employees eligible for the exchange. 
4.3 Analyst Following as an Alternative Information Environment Variable 
Institutional ownership and the informativeness of the firm’s financial statements 
capture only two dimensions of the multifaceted information environment of a firm.  As 
the model in this study already includes two interaction terms, inclusion of additional 
information environment variables and their accompanying interactions in the regression 
creates severe multicollinearity issues.  To test whether the conclusions of this study are 
robust to other information environment dimensions without increasing the number of 
additional variables and interactions, I employ alternative models that use analyst 
following and size as information environment variables of interest.  
Prior research has frequently examined analyst following and institutional 
ownership together as information environment variables (e.g., O’Brian and Bushnan 
1990, Ayers and Freeman 2003).  Higher analyst following has been associated with 
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greater external monitoring and improved liquidity as information production and 
dissemination for the firm increases through analysts’ activities (see Yu 2008 and Kirk 
2011 for recent examples). In the context of firms with ESPPs, Babenko and Sen (2012) 
find that employees’ purchases have greater predictive power for smaller firms with less 
analyst coverage.  However, the relatively strong correlation between analyst following 
and size (correlation = 0.57, p-value < 0.01) and the use of a size-controlled returns 
measure may result in the variable yielding little explanatory power (due to the size 
adjustment) while contributing to the multicollinearity problem (due to the presence of an 
additional interaction term).  Thus, an alternative specification is as follows: 
  ABRETM  α0  α1PCT α2IO  α3PCT_IO  α4FOLLOW  α5PCT_FOLLOW  ε 
Results are reported in Table 8.  I find that participation is marginally significant 
in the six-month window (p=0.051) and is significant in the nine-month window 
(p=0.037); however, the variable loses significance as the window is extended to 12 
months.  The participation-institutional ownership interaction is positive and significant 
in the first window (p=0.045) and marginally significant in the second (p=0.054).  The 
effect dissipates by the time that the one-year mark is reached.  The analyst following 
interaction is not significant in any of the three windows, which is also the case for the 
analyst following main effect.  These results are generally consistent with, albeit weaker 
than, those reported in Table 5.  The results using size in lieu of analyst following are 
qualitatively similar. 
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4.4 Removing the Effect of Pure Vesting Extensions 
Participation in a one-for-one exchange that involves only a vesting extension 
may be more difficult to interpret when employees have positive private information and 
anticipate lengthy tenure with the company.19  An employee who has a rosy outlook 
based on positive private information might not view a one-for-one option exchange with 
a vesting extension as imposing material costs in return for the benefit of a reduced 
exercise price.  In particular, such an employee might plan to stay with the firm 
indefinitely and thus view the incremental risk of forfeiture as a result of the vesting 
extension as negligible.  Under these circumstances, positive private information could 
result in higher employee participation, which is inconsistent with my primary 
hypothesis. 
To address this potential inconsistency, I repeat the CEO inclusion analyses from 
Table 6 but omit exchanges that require only extended vesting in exchange for a 
decreased exercise price.  The results excluding these pure vesting extensions are 
reported in Table 9.  Participation is negative and significant at conventional levels in the 
six- and nine-month windows, but loses significance in the 12-month window. Similarly, 
the participation-institutional ownership interaction is positive and significant in the six-
month window and marginally significant in the nine-month window.  The participation-
financial statement informativeness interaction is insignificant across all three windows.   
In summary, my primary results are robust to the removal of vesting extensions.   
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 Rational employees who have negative private information should still participate in an exchange even if 
they are not sure whether their employment will continue, as participation is administratively simple and 
preserves an improved package in the event that the employees’ tenure lasts longer than expected. This is 
consistent with a negative outlook resulting in higher participation, and is therefore in keeping with my 
primary hypothesis. 
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4.5 The Impact of Value-for-Value Structure 
 Value-for-value structure is another characteristic of interest that may affect my 
primary results.  On one hand, a value-for-value exchange structure imposes the most 
severe economic costs on participating employees in return for the benefit of a more 
achievable payout hurdle.  By this reasoning, value-for-value exchanges appear to present 
the best setting for detecting the presence of negative private information.  On the other 
hand, value-for-value structure is the design feature most associated with “shareholder 
friendliness” and is often adopted in response to outside pressure (Larcker et al. 2012); as 
such, a value-for-value exchange structure may serve as a proxy for a highly transparent 
information environment that makes detecting private information less likely.  It is 
unclear which of these competing effects will be dominant. 
 To assess the impact of value-for-value structure, I split the CEO inclusion 
sample into value-for-value and non-value-for-value subgroups and re-run the main 
regressions on both subsamples.  Results for the non-value-for-value subsample are 
reported in Table 10.  Consistent with previous analyses, the effect of PCT in the non-
value-for-value subsample is negative and statistically significant in the first two 
windows (p-values < 0.01). Further, the participation-institutional ownership interaction 
is positive and highly significant in the first window, and marginally significant in the 
second window.  These results contrast sharply with those of the value-for-value 
subsample reported in Table 11, which show no significance on the participation variable 
over the six- and nine-month windows, and only marginal significance in the 12-month 
window.   In untabulated analyses, I extend the measurement window for the dependent 
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variable to 18 months and 24 months and find no statistically significant effect for 
participation in the value-for-value subsample.  Thus, the transparency effect of value-
for-value structure appears to dominate the cost effect. 
4.6 Other Returns Considerations 
To ensure that my primary conclusions are not driven by the effects of exchange-
related announcements, I re-run the main analysis presented in Table 5 using alternative 
start dates for the compounding of buy-and-hold returns, including the month of 
exchange inception and the month after the disclosure date. The results are qualitatively 
similar.  
In considering the central question of this study, both the level of information that 
is already embedded in prices and the speed at which new information is impounded into 
returns are relevant.  Thus far my analyses have been concerned with longer-window 
effects; short-window effects may also be of interest, however.  On one hand, investors 
may react negatively (but incompletely) to the participation disclosure itself over the 
short run; on the other hand, they might have a positive reaction to the disclosure in 
anticipation of valuable retention benefits.  To further assess these dynamics as they 
relate to participation, I compute short-window daily cumulative abnormal returns around 
the participation disclosure date for three windows and exclude observations for which an 
earnings or dividend announcement occurred during the window.  No statistically 
significant reaction is discernible in the (-1,1), (-1,5) and (-1,10) windows for the overall 
mean cumulative abnormal return (Table 12, Panel A). When the observations are 
partitioned at the 50th percentile of PCT, however, the standardized mean abnormal 
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returns are found to be statistically different between groups for the (-1,1) and (-1,5) 
windows (Table 12, Panel B).  By the (-1,10) window, the significant difference between 
CARs for the high and low groups disappears. 
 I next regress short-window returns on the main regression variables for this 
sample of uncontaminated events.  As shown in Table 13, the main effect of PCT is 
positive and significant in the (-1,1) window and is dampened by a negative and 
significant coefficient on PCT_FRSQ.  The significance of PCT decreases as the window 
lengthens, and the interaction term becomes insignificant in the (-1,5) and (-1,10) 
windows.   
 Partitioning the uncontaminated event sample by whether the CEO is included in 
the exchange reveals that PCT is insignificant across windows for the CEO inclusion 
subsample (Table 14), but is positive and marginally significant to significant across the 
CEO exclusion subsample and is offset in part by a negative coefficient on PCT_FRSQ 
(Table 15).20  Taken together, the primary analyses and short-window results suggest that 
the market assigns some short-term value to the potential retention benefit of exchange 
participation when the CEO is excluded from the program.    
4.7 Alternative Measures of Performance 
In this section, I consider the association between participation and two different 
operating measures—the change in future operating earnings, and the change in future 
operating cash flows.  Abnormal returns are the most natural dependent measure for my 
primary analyses, as they allow me to test what employees know relative to other market 
                                                 
20
 In untabulated results, I find that significance for all variables disappears for both the combined and 
partitioned regressions as the window increases to (-1,20) and (-1, 60). 
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participants and the implications of the information environment.  Over longer windows, 
however, abnormal returns become increasingly difficult to reliably measure for 
nonrandom samples (e.g., Lyon et al. 1999, Kothari and Warner 2007). Operating 
measures do not permit the testing of market-related hypotheses, but they do provide an 
additional channel for assessing whether employees of exchange firms possess 
information that is eventually reflected in long-run performance.   
For this purpose, I use a simple model that expresses a firm’s future change in 
operating earnings (operating cash flows) as a function of its asset base, growth 
opportunities (book-to-market ratio), and prior change in operating earnings (operating 
cash flows). The model is a streamlined version of the changes model presented in 
Aboody et al. (2010), with participation included as an independent variable.  The future 
change in operating earnings (operating cash flows) is measured for the first and second 
year after the exchange.  All change variables are scaled by total assets. 
 Tables 16 reports results of the changes analyses for the full sample.  As 
anticipated, the coefficient on PCT is negative and significant in the one- and two-year-
forward earnings change regressions (p = 0.015; p = 0.020) and is negative and 
marginally significant in the two-year-forward cash flow change regression (p=0.056). 
(Due to multicollinearity, the other variables exhibit limited or no significance.)      
The negative association of PCT with changes in future operating performance 
measures provides additional, albeit indirect, support for H1.  Moreover, partitioning the 
data by whether the CEO is eligible to participate yields results that are broadly 
consistent with previous analyses:  when the CEO is included in the exchange, the 
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coefficient on PCT is negative and marginally significant in the one- and two-year-
forward earnings change regressions (p = 0.073; p = 0.081) and is negative and 
marginally significant in the two-year-forward cash flow change regression (p=0.071), as 
shown in Table 17.  As before, excluding the CEO from the exchange results in no 
significance for the PCT variable (Table 18). 
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CONCLUSION AND LIMITATIONS 
 Employee stock option exchange programs offer a unique opportunity to observe 
eligible employees’ collective sentiment about the future prospects of their publicly 
traded employers.  When employees willingly reduce their upside potential by trading 
out-of-the-money options for replacement compensation with less upside and a reduced 
payout hurdle, they reveal a low subjective assessment of the firm’s future prospects.  
Similarly, when employees abstain from participating in an exchange, they reveal a 
higher subjective assessment of the firm’s ability to achieve strong performance in future 
periods.  Determining whether their assessments (as conveyed in participation) embed 
information that is not already known to the broader market is the objective of this study. 
An important characteristic of stock option exchange programs from a research 
design perspective is the timing of their implementation.  Broadly speaking, stock option 
exchange programs are only offered after significant, negative performance shocks.  The 
presence of these adverse shocks renders the modern exchange setting ideal for assessing 
whether the results of prior research showing that non-executive employees possess 
valuable private information in other equity contexts are generalizable to non-steady-state 
conditions.   
Using a modern sample of employee stock option exchanges occurring from 2006 
to 2010, this study provides evidence that the level of employee participation in an 
exchange program does contain information about a firm’s subsequent stock price 
performance.  Specifically, I find that employee participation is negatively related to 
abnormal returns in the six-, nine-, and 12-month windows following the exchange.  The 
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relation between participation and returns is weaker when institutional ownership and 
financial statement informativeness are higher. Furthermore, the relation between 
participation and future abnormal returns is attributable primarily to exchange events in 
which the CEO is eligible to participate.  These results are robust to the inclusion of 
controls for market conditions during the Great Recession. 
 On its face, the lack of significance in the CEO exclusion subsample appears 
inconsistent with the results of Huddart and Lang (2003) and Babenko and Sen (2012), 
who find that non-executive employees possess private information that can predict 
future returns.  Yet I can neither conclude that non-CEO participants in the CEO 
inclusion subsample have no private information nor assert that the CEO’s participation 
itself drives the results. This is the case because aggregation of CEO and non-CEO 
participation in the tender offer disclosures limits my ability to draw inferences regarding 
the ultimate source of information among participating employees in the CEO inclusion 
sample. 
 Research into the information conveyed by employees’ equity compensation 
decisions is in its nascent stages.  By providing insight into the relation between 
employee participation and future abnormal returns in a modern stock option exchange 
setting, this study augments a small but growing literature on a topic that is of vital 
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Source: SEC Form DEF 14A, “Notice of Special Meeting of Stockholders to be Held 
April 21, 2009,” filed by NetApp, Inc. on March 23, 2009 
 
Reasons for implementing an exchange program  
Our stock price has experienced a significant decline over the past year due in large 
part to the continued weak economy and overall weakness in the capital markets. 
Furthermore, many of our top customers operate in industries such as financial services, 
technology and telecommunications, which have experienced a disproportionately 
negative effect from the economic downturn. As a result, our largest customers have 
significantly reduced their spending and some have gone out of business, which has 
negatively impacted our business. We have taken a number of actions in recent months to 
cut costs and restructure our business in an effort to return to our business model and 
increase our market valuation, but those efforts have not had an impact on our stock price 
to date. Meanwhile, as of February 28, 2009 over 95% of our employees hold stock 
options which are underwater, and as a result our equity incentive program does not 
provide the retention or incentive value it is intended to provide. At the same time, the 
market for key employees remains extremely competitive, notwithstanding the current 
economy.  
 
Because of the continued challenging economic environment and the lack of impact 
on our stock price from our efforts to restructure our business, we believe these 
underwater stock options are no longer effective incentives to motivate and retain our 
employees. We believe that employees perceive that these options have little or no value. 
In addition, although these stock options are not likely to be exercised as long as our 
stock price is lower than the applicable exercise price, they will remain on our books with 
the potential to dilute stockholders’ interests for up to the full remaining term of these 
options, while delivering little or no retentive or motivation value.  
 
We believe an exchange program is an important component in our strategy to align 
the interests of our employees and stockholders because it will permit us to:  
 
 motivate eligible employees to continue to build stockholder value and achieve 
future stock price growth by exchanging underwater stock options for RSUs with 
new extended vesting periods, and which have a value that moves directly in line 
with our stock price. We believe that stock options that are significantly 
underwater do not serve to motivate or help retain our employees. We believe that 
the option exchange would aid both the motivation and retention of those 
employees participating in the option exchange, while better aligning the interests 
of our employees with the interests of our stockholders. 
 
 meaningfully reduce our total number of outstanding stock options, or 
“overhang,” represented by outstanding grants that have exercise prices so high 
they no longer motivate their holders to remain as our employees. Allowing these 
grants to remain outstanding does not serve the interests of our stockholders and 
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does not provide the benefits intended by our equity compensation program. By 
replacing these grants with a lesser number of RSUs, our overhang and the 
potential dilution of the stockholders’ interests will decrease. We believe that after 
the exchange program, the overhang provided by our equity grants, including the 
newly granted RSUs, would represent a more appropriate balance between our 
objectives for our equity compensation program and our stockholders’ interest in 
minimizing overhang and potential dilution. 
 
 better align compensation costs with the retention and motivation value that we 
are trying to capture with our outstanding stock option grants. These grants were 
made at the then fair market value of our common stock. Under applicable 
accounting rules, we are required to continue to recognize compensation expense 
related to these grants, even if these grants are never exercised because they 
remain underwater. We believe it is not an efficient use of corporate resources to 
recognize compensation expense on awards that never provide value to our 
employees. By replacing stock options that have little or no retention or incentive 
value with RSUs that will provide both retention and motivation value while 
incurring only minimal incremental compensation expense, we will be making 
more efficient use of our resources.  
 
 
Why the exchange program is the best alternative  
In considering how best to continue to motivate, retain and reward our employees 
who have options that are underwater, we evaluated several alternatives, including the 
following: 
 
 Increase Cash Compensation. To replace the intended benefits of options, we 
would need to substantially increase cash compensation. These increases would 
substantially increase our compensation expense and reduce our cash position and 
cash flow from operations. In addition, these increases would not reduce our 
overhang. 
 
 Grant Additional Equity Awards. We considered granting employees additional 
options at current market prices. However, we determined that this alternative 
would not be feasible due to insufficient shares remaining in our equity plans for a 
Company-wide retention program and because such additional grants would cause 
us to exceed our desired “burn rate” for consumption of shares in our equity 
plans. Further, additional grants would substantially increase our equity award 
overhang and the potential dilution to our stockholders and would increase our 
compensation expense accordingly. 
 
 Exchange Options for Options with a Lower Price. We considered implementing 
a program to exchange underwater options for new options having an exercise 
price equal to the market price of our common stock on the date of the exchange. 
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However, we believe that an option-for-RSU exchange provides several 
advantages over an option-for-option exchange program. First, an option-for-RSU 
exchange program will require us to issue significantly fewer shares than an 
option-for-option exchange program. thereby providing a more significant 
reduction in our stockholder dilution and overhang. Also, unlike options, RSUs 
provide value to employees even if current poor economic conditions continue 
and our stock price fails to increase. However, if we determine that adverse tax 
consequences may arise in an option-for-RSU exchange in some non-U.S. 
jurisdictions, we may grant a lesser number of options rather than RSUs (with 
appropriate adjustments to the exchange ratios) in exchange for surrendered 
options in those jurisdictions.   
 
We determined that a program under which employees could exchange eligible options 
for a lesser number of RSUs was most attractive for a number of reasons, including the 
following:  
 
 Reasonable, Balanced Incentives.  Under the exchange program, participating 
employees will surrender eligible options for a lesser number of RSUs with new 
vesting requirements. We believe the grant of a lesser number of RSUs is a 
reasonable and balanced exchange for the eligible options. 
 
 Restore Retention and Motivation Incentives.  Many companies, especially those 
in the technology industry, have long used equity awards as a means of attracting, 
motivating and retaining their best employees, while aligning those employees’ 
interests with those of the stockholders. We continue to believe that equity grants 
are an important component of our employees’ total compensation, and that 
replacing this component with additional cash compensation to remain 
competitive could have a material adverse effect on our financial position and 
cash flow from operations. We also believe that in order to have the desired 
impact on employee motivation and retention, our employee options would need 
to be exercisable near or above the current price of our common stock. The failure 
to address the underwater option issue in the near to medium term will make it 
more difficult for us to retain our key employees. If we cannot retain these 
employees, our ability to compete with other companies in our industry could be 
jeopardized, which could adversely affect our business, results of operations and 
future stock price. We believe that the grant of RSUs with new extended vesting 
periods which have a value that moves directly in line with our stock price, an 
option exchange would aid both the motivation and retention of employees 
participating in the exchange program. 
 
 Overhang Reduction.  Not only do the underwater options have little or no 
retention value, they cannot be removed from our equity award overhang until 
they are exercised, or are cancelled due to expiration or the employee’s 
termination. Underwater and unvested options also continue to have considerable 
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compensation expense. The exchange program will reduce our overhang while 
eliminating the ineffective eligible options that are currently outstanding. Under 
the proposed exchange program, participating employees will receive RSUs 
covering a lesser number of shares than the number of shares covered by the 
surrendered options. By granting a lesser number of RSUs in exchange for 
options, the number of shares of stock subject to outstanding equity awards will 
be reduced, thereby reducing our equity overhang. Further, shares cancelled under 
the Plans (other than our 1999 Plan) will no longer be available for future grants 
of equity awards, which will further reduce current as well as future equity 
overhang.  
 
 Pressure for Additional Grants.  If we are unable to conduct a program in which 
underwater options with low incentive value may be exchanged for a lesser 
number of RSUs with higher motivation and retention value, we may be 
compelled to issue additional options or other equity awards to our employees at 
current market prices in order to provide our employees with renewed incentive 
value. Any such additional grants would increase our overhang as well as our 
compensation expense, and could exhaust our current pool of shares available for 
future grant.   
 
 Optimal Alignment of Employee and Stockholder Interests.  The exchange 
program will allow us to optimize the shares reserved under our 1999 Plan to 
more effectively align the interests of our employees and our stockholders. A 
reduced number of RSUs will be granted in exchange for surrendered underwater 
options. In addition, in order to mitigate the potential dilutive impact of the 
exchange program to our stockholders, after we grant the new RSUs in exchange 
for surrendered options, we will reduce the share reserve under the 1999 Plan 
such that, in effect, we will retain only a sufficient number of shares for the new 
RSU grants plus an additional 3.5 million of the surrendered shares. Assuming all 
eligible options are surrendered in the exchange, we would cancel approximately 
20.4 million shares from the 1999 Plan after the shares underlying surrendered 
options are returned to the plan. Furthermore, any shares underlying surrendered 
options which were granted under any of our other Plans will not be available for 
future grant. As a result, assuming all eligible options are surrendered in the 
exchange, we would cancel approximately 8.7 million shares from such other 
Plans.  
 
The exchange program will take place if and only if it is approved by our 
stockholders. If our stockholders do not approve the exchange program, eligible 
options will remain outstanding and in effect in accordance with their existing 
terms. We will continue to recognize compensation expense for these eligible options 
even though the options may have little or no retention or motivation value. 
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APPENDIX B  
EXCERPT FROM EXCHANGE PROGRAM TERM SHEET AND Q&A DOCUMENT 
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Source: SEC Form SC TO-I, EX-99.(A)(1)(A), “Offer to Exchange Certain Outstanding 
Options for Restricted Stock Units” filed by NetApp, Inc. on May 22, 2009 
 
Q1. What is the offer? 
 
A1. This offer is an opportunity for eligible employees to voluntarily exchange 
outstanding options with an exercise price greater than or equal to $22.00 per share that 




Q3. How many RSUs will I receive for the options that I exchange? 
 
A3. The number of RSUs that you receive will depend on the exercise price of your 
exchanged options, as follows: 
 
Per Share Exercise Price of Eligible 
Options RSUs Granted for Exchanged Options 
$22.00 — $27.30  1 RSU for every 5 exchanged options 
$27.31 — $32.49  1 RSU for every 6 exchanged options 
$32.50 — $37.99  1 RSU for every 7 exchanged options 
$38.00 — $46.99  1 RSU for every 10 exchanged options 
$47.00 and higher  1 RSU for every 25 exchanged options 
 
As noted above, for purposes of this offer, including the exchange ratios, the term 
“option” refers to an option to purchase one (1) share of our common stock, and the term 
“option grant” means a grant of one (1) or more options. For purposes of applying the 
exchange ratios, fractional RSUs will be rounded down to the nearest whole RSU on a 
grant-by-grant basis. (See Section 2) 
If, with respect to the surrender of options received pursuant to a particular option grant, 
you would otherwise be entitled to receive fewer than forty (40) RSUs in the exchange, 
then we will make a cash payment instead of granting RSUs. The cash payment will be 
equal to the closing market price of a share of NetApp’s common stock on the business 
day immediately prior to the expiration date multiplied by the number of RSUs that 
would otherwise have been granted in exchange for such surrendered options. The cash 
payment, less applicable withholdings, will be made as soon as practicable after the RSU 
grant date and will not be subject to any vesting schedule. 
 
Please note: The exchange ratios apply to each of your option grants separately. 
This means that all of the outstanding options that you received pursuant to a 
particular option grant will be aggregated and divided by the applicable exchange 
ratio. As a result, the various eligible options you hold may be subject to different 
exchange ratios to the extent that such options were originally received pursuant to 
different option grants. (See Section 2) 
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Example: Assume that you have 1,000 outstanding options that you received pursuant to 
a single option grant, and the exercise price of each such option is $32.00 per share. If 
you tender all 1,000 options for exchange, you will receive 166 RSUs on the RSU grant 
date. This number is the result obtained by dividing 1,000 by 6 (i.e. the exchange ratio for 
an eligible option with an exercise price of $32.00) and rounding down to the nearest 
whole RSU. 
 
Example: Assume that you have eligible options that you received pursuant to two 
separate option grants. In the first grant, you received 50 options with an exercise price of 
$32.00 per share. In the second grant, you received 100 options with an exercise price of 
$40 per share. Assume the closing market price for NetApp’s common stock is $17.00 on 
the business day immediately prior to the expiration date. If you tender all of the options 
received pursuant to the two grants (i.e. 150 options), then you will receive a cash 
payment of $306.00, less applicable withholding. This amount represents the cash value, 
based on the closing market price of NetApp’s common stock on the business day 
immediately prior to the expiration date, of the 8 RSUs that you would have otherwise 
received in exchange for the 50 options received in the first option grant and the 10 RSUs 
that you would have otherwise received in exchange for the 100 options received in the 
second option grant. 
 
Q4. Who may participate in this offer? 
 
A4. You may participate in this offer if you are an eligible employee of NetApp at the 
time of this offer and you remain an eligible employee of NetApp or a successor entity 
through the RSU grant date. In addition, you may participate in this offer only if you 
reside in the United States, Australia, Austria, People’s Republic of China, France, 
Germany, Hong Kong, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, the Netherlands, Singapore, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, or the United Kingdom. Our executive officers and the 
members of our board of directors may not participate in the offer. (See Section 1) 
 
Q5. Why is NetApp making this offer? 
 
A5. We are making this offer to restore the retention and incentive benefits of our equity 
awards. We believe that this offer will help us to retain our valuable employees and better 
align the interests of our employees and stockholders to maximize stockholder value. We 
issued the currently outstanding options to attract and retain the best available personnel 
and to provide additional incentives to our employees. However, our stock price, like that 
of many other companies in our industry, has declined significantly in the past year. As a 
result, most of our employees hold options with exercise prices significantly higher than 
the current market price of our common stock. These options are commonly referred to as 
being “underwater.” By making this offer, we intend to provide eligible employees with 
the opportunity to receive RSUs that have greater retention value because, unlike 
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underwater options, such RSUs provide value to employees even if our stock price 
remains depressed. (Section 3) 
 
Q6. Which of my options are eligible? 
 
A6. Your eligible options are those options to purchase shares of common stock of 
NetApp that have an exercise price greater than or equal to $22.00 per share, were 
granted under the Plans before June 20, 2008 and remain outstanding and unexercised as 
of the expiration date, currently expected to be June 19, 2009. For a complete listing of 
your outstanding options, please refer to your Smith Barney Benefit Access account at 
www.benefitaccess.com, which lists your outstanding options, the grant date of your 
options, the exercise price of your options and the number of shares subject to your 
outstanding options. (See Section 2) 
 
Q7. Are there circumstances under which I would not be granted RSUs? 
 
A7. Yes. If, for any reason, you are no longer an employee of NetApp on the RSU grant 
date, you will not receive any RSUs. Instead, you will keep your current eligible options 
and the eligible options will vest and expire in accordance with their terms. Except as 
provided by applicable law and/or any employment agreement between you and NetApp, 
your employment with NetApp will remain “at-will” regardless of your participation in 
the offer and can be terminated by you or your employer at any time with or without 




We also reserve the right, in our reasonable judgment, before the expiration date to 
terminate or amend the offer and to postpone our acceptance and cancellation of any 
options elected to be exchanged if any of the events listed in Section 7 of this Offer to 
Exchange occurs, by giving oral or written notice of the termination or postponement to 




If, with respect to the surrender of options received pursuant to a particular option grant, 
you would otherwise have been entitled to receive fewer than forty (40) RSUs in the 
exchange, then we will make a cash payment instead of granting RSUs. The cash 
payment will be equal to the closing market price of a share of NetApp’s common stock 
on the business day immediately prior to the expiration date multiplied by the number of 
RSUs that would otherwise have been granted in exchange for such surrendered options. 
The cash payment, less applicable withholdings, will be made as soon as practicable after 
the cancellation date and will not be subject to any vesting schedule. 
 
Q8. Am I required to participate in this option exchange? 
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A8. Participation in this offer is completely voluntary. (See Section 2) 
 
Q9. When will my RSUs vest? 
 
A9. Each RSU represents the right to receive one share of our common stock on a 
specified future date if the RSU has vested in accordance with the vesting schedules 
summarized in the table and further described below, subject to your continuing to be an 
employee or other service provider to NetApp through each relevant vesting date: 
 
Unvested or Partially 
Exercise Price Vested Option Grant Fully Vested Option Grant 
$22.00 — $27.30 4 Years 
(1/4 on each anniversary of grant 
date)  
2 Years 
(1/2 on each anniversary of grant 
date) 
$27.31 — $32.49 4 Years 
(1/4 on each anniversary of grant 
date)  
2 Years 
(1/2 on each anniversary of grant 
date) 
$32.50 — $37.99 4 Years 




(1/2 on each anniversary of grant 
date) 
 
$38.00 — $46.99 
4 Years 




(1/3 on each anniversary of grant 
date) 
Equal to or 
greater 
than $47.00  
4 Years 
(1/4 on each anniversary of grant 
date)  
3 Years 
(1/3 on each anniversary of grant 
date) 
 
 The vesting schedule of the RSUs will be determined on a grant-by-grant basis 
and depend on the extent to which the option grant surrendered in exchange for 
such RSUs has vested at the time of such exchange and, for a surrendered option 
grant that is fully vested, the exercise price. 
 
 None of the RSUs will be vested as of the RSU grant date. 
 
 No RSUs will be scheduled to vest earlier than one year from their date of grant. 
 
 The annual vesting date will be the anniversary of the RSU grant date. 
 
 If the surrendered option grant is entirely unvested or partially vested, then 
regardless of the exercise price of such surrendered options, the RSU will vest as 
to one-fourth of the RSUs on each of the first four anniversaries of the grant date, 
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so that 100% of the RSUs will be vested on the fourth anniversary of the grant 
date, provided that the eligible employee remains in continued serviced with the 
Company through each vesting date. 
 
 If the surrendered option grant has an exercise price between $22.00 and $37.99 
per share and is fully vested, then the RSUs will vest as to 50% of the RSUs on 
each of the first two anniversaries of the grant date, so that 100% of the RSUs will 
be vested on the second anniversary of the grant date, provided the eligible 
employee remains in continued service with the Company through each vesting 
date. 
 
 If the surrendered option grant has an exercise price of $38.00 per share or greater 
and is fully vested, then the RSUs will vest as to one-third of the RSUs on each of 
the first three anniversaries of the grant date, so that 100% of the RSUs will be 
vested on the third anniversary of the grant date, provided the eligible employee 
remains in continued service with the Company through each vesting date. 
 
 We will make minor modifications to the vesting schedule of any RSUs to 
eliminate fractional vesting (such that a whole number of RSUs will vest on each 
vesting date); this will be done by rounding up to the nearest whole number of 
RSUs that will vest on the first vesting date and rounding down on the following 
vesting date. 
 
 If, with respect to the surrender of options received pursuant to a particular option 
grant, you would otherwise be entitled to receive fewer than forty (40) RSUs in 
the exchange, then we will make a cash payment instead of granting RSUs. The 
cash payment will be equal to the closing market price of a share of NetApp’s 
common stock on the business day immediately prior to the expiration date 
multiplied by the number of RSUs that would otherwise have been granted in 
exchange for such surrendered options. The cash payment, less applicable 
withholdings, will be made as soon as practicable after the RSU grant date and 
will not be subject to any vesting schedule. 
 
Q10. If I participate in this offer, do I have to exchange all of my eligible options? 
 
A10. You may pick and choose which of your outstanding eligible option grants you 
wish to exchange. However, if you decide to exchange any options received pursuant to a 
particular option grant, you must exchange all of the outstanding options received 
pursuant to such grant (i.e. you must make your election to participate on a grant-by-grant 
basis). You should note that we are not accepting partial tenders of option grants, except 
that (a) you may partially tender an option grant covered by a domestic relations order (or 
comparable legal document as the result of the end of a marriage) (See Question and 
Answer 11), and (b) you may elect to exchange all of the options received pursuant to 





Q30. Are you making any recommendation as to whether I should exchange my 
eligible options? 
 
A30. No. We are not making any recommendation as to whether you should accept this 
offer. We understand that the decision whether or not to exchange your eligible options in 
this offer will be a challenging one for many employees. The program does carry risk 
(see “Risks of Participating in the Offer” beginning on page 14 for information regarding 
some of these risks), and there are no guarantees that you ultimately would receive 
greater value from the RSUs you will receive in exchange than you would if you had 
retained your corresponding options. As a result, you must make your own decision as to 
whether or not to participate in this offer. For questions regarding personal tax 
implications or other investment- or tax-related questions, you should talk to your legal 
counsel, accountant, and/or financial advisor. (See Section 3) 
 
[…] 
Risks that are Specific to this Offer 
 
If the price of our common stock increases after the date on which your options are 
cancelled, your cancelled options might have been worth more than the RSUs that you 
receive in exchange for them. 
Because the exchange ratio of this offer is not one-for-one with respect to all awards, 
it is possible that, at some point in the future, your eligible options would have been 
economically more valuable than the RSUs granted pursuant to this offer. For example, if 
you exchange an option grant for 500 shares with an exercise price of $38.00, you would 
receive 50 RSUs. Assume, for illustrative purposes only, that three (3) years after the new 
grant date, the price of our common stock has increased to $55.00 per share. Under this 
example, if you had kept your exchanged options and exercised them at $55.00 per share, 
you would have realized pre-tax gain of $8,500, but if you exchanged your options and 





Panel A: Overview of Sample Selection Procedure 
 
 
Form SC TO-C Reconciliation, 2006-2010 
 
 
Total SC TO-C filings 
 
1882  
Less: filings for other transactions  (1487)  
Total exchange-related filings  395  
Less: 409A exchanges  (40)  
Less: additional filings for same exchange  (201)  
Subtotal  154  
Less: exchanges not completed  (1)  
Plus: exchanges from SC TO-I and I/A Forms 
         not already counted above 
 
105  
Subtotal  258  
Less: observations with missing IDs or variables  49  




This table presents a numeric summary of the sample selection procedure and is discussed more 
fully on pages 19 and 20.  Forms SC TO-C, SC TO-I, and SC TO-I/A were obtained from the 
SEC website.   
 
Panel B: Stock Option Exchange Characteristics 
 
Exchange Terms 
New Options 64.9% 




Lengthened Vesting 73.7% 
This table presents a summary of exchange program terms presented to eligible employees.  New 
Options, New Restricted Stock, and Cash refer to the percentage of firms that offer each type of 
replacement compensation in exchange for the out-of-the-money options tendered. Value-for-
Value refers to exchanges that cap the fair value of the replacement awards to be no higher than 
the fair value of the old awards at the time of the exchange.  One-for- One refers to exchanges 
that replace each out-of-the-money option tendered with one new options.  Lengthened Vesting 
refers to exchanges that increase vesting time. 
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TABLE 1 (cont.) 
 




Healthcare, Medical Equipment, Pharmaceutical Products 13.3% 
Construction and Construction Materials 2.4% 
Electrical and Fabricated Equipment, Machinery 2.4% 
Planes, Trains, Ships, and Automobiles 2.4% 
Petroleum and Natural Gas 2.4% 
Communication 4.3% 
Personal and Business Services 14.3% 
Business Equipment 38.6% 
Wholesale and Retail 4.8% 
Restaurants, Hotels, Motels 1.9% 
Banking, Insurance, Real Estate, Trading 6.7% 
Other 1.9% 
This table presents the percentage of observations in the sample that fall into each of the listed 
industries. Both the Personal and Business Services category and the Business Equipment 



















Compustat Nonzero Stock Compensation Sample 
  N Mean Std  Q1 Med Q3 
 
N Mean Std  Q1 Med Q3 
Market Cap  208 1,750 5,045 103 258 800 
 
30,664 2,844 8,862 49 259 1316 
Sales to 
Assets 
 208 0.87 0.72  0.46 0.71 1.02 
 
32,861 0.87 0.83  0.25 0.66 1.20 
Net Margin  206 -0.52 1.85  -0.28 -0.07 0.02 
 
32,858 -1.91  .48  -0.13 0.03 0.10 
Debt to Assets  206 0.21 0.27  0.00 0.09 0.34 
 
32,755 0.27 0.39  0.02 0.17 0.36 
Stock Comp.  205 0.09 0.31  0.01 0.02 0.07 
 
32,867 0.26 1.40  0.00 0.01 0.03 
OCF Ratio  208 0.74 7.96  -0.51 0.33 1.71 
 
32,828 1.12 4.87  0.10 1.00 1.95 
R&D to Sales  206 0.39 1.35 0.00 0.13 0.27 32,867 0.42 2.35  0.00 0.00 0.06 
Z Score  196 -0.76 3.92  -1.53 0.34 1.50 
 
26,970 -2.94 16.51  -0.82 0.91 2.04 
Tobin's Q  194 0.90 0.96  0.30 0.70 1.13 
 
25,288 1.99 3.77  0.60 1.03 1.85 
ROA - NI  208 -0.15 0.28  -0.21 -0.05 0.02 
 
32,855 -0.13 0.59  -0.08 0.01 0.06 
Moneyness   206 -0.42 0.35  -0.68 -0.47 -0.25 
 
27,795 0.16 0.95  -0.43 -0.02 0.45 
 
This table presents a side-by-side summary of firm characteristics for exchange firms and the universe of Compustat firms reporting 
nonzero stock compensation expense from 2006 to 2010.  Observations are winsorized at 1% and 99%.  MVE is equal to fiscal year-
end stock price multiplied by the number of common shares outstanding.  Sales to Assets is equal to total revenue divided by total 
assets as of fiscal year end.  Net margin is net income divided by total revenue.  Debt to assets is equal to long-term debt (including 
the current portion) divided by total assets as of fiscal year end.  Stock Comp is equal to stock compensation expense divided by total 
revenue.  OCF Ratio is equal to operating cash flow divided by net income. Z Score is the Altman’s unlevered z score (MacKie-
Mason 1990).  Tobin’s Q is equal to the sum of MVE, preferred stock, current liabilities netted against current assets, and total long 
term debt, all divided by total assets.  Return on Assets is equal to net income divided by average total assets.  Moneyness is equal to 
the fiscal year end stock price less the weighted average exercise price of options outstanding as of fiscal year end, divided by the 




Descriptive Statistics for Regression Variables 
 
  Full Sample 
  N Mean Std  Q1 Med Q3 
PCT 209 0.805 0.177 0.716 0.850 0.949 
IO 209 0.593 0.282 0.398 0.593 0.844 
FRSQ 209 0.507 0.251 0.318 0.510 0.705 
FOLLOW 209 1.380 2.340 1.387 1.946 2.485 
NOCEO 209 0.560 0.498 0.000 1.000 1.000 
ABRET6 209 0.136 0.652 -0.192 0.012 0.217 
ABRET9 209 0.128 0.702 -0.232 -0.017 0.267 
ABRET12 209 0.239 1.536 -0.352 -0.033 0.283 
 
This table presents descriptive statistics for the full sample.  PCT is the percentage of eligible 
options that were exchanged in the program as disclosed in the tender offer statement.  IO is the 
percentage of institutional holdings as of the most recent quarter ended prior to the exchange.  
FRSQ is the R2 from a financial statement informativeness regression, computed as in Frankel 
and Li (2004).  FOLLOW is the natural logarithm of 1+ the maximum number of analysts 
following the firm during the year prior to the exchange year. NOCEO equals 1 if the CEO is not 
included in the exchange and 0 otherwise.  ABRET6, ABRET9, and ABRET12 are characteristics-
based buy-and-hold abnormal returns calculated over the six-, nine-, and 12-month periods 
following exchange inception using the method in Daniel et al. (1997) and adjusting for 












Pearson and Spearman Correlations 
 
VARIABLE ABRET6 ABRET9 ABRET12 PCT IO FOLLOW NOCEO FRSQ  
 
ABRET6 1.00 0.84 0.70 -0.06 -0.17 0.00 -0.17 -0.02  
  _  [0.00] [0.00] [0.38] [0.01] [0.95] [0.01] [0.75]  
ABRET9 0.77 1.00 0.83 -0.09 -0.13 0.03 -0.11 0.06  
  [0.00] _  [0.00] [0.21] [0.06] [0.67] [0.11] [0.41]  
ABRET12 0.68 0.85 1.00 -0.04 -0.10 0.03 -0.14 0.08  
  [0.00] [0.00] _  [0.52] [0.13] [0.69] [0.04] [0.27]  
PCT 0.01 -0.05 -0.06 1.00 0.01 -0.14 -0.19 0.01  
 [0.88] [0.49] [0.37] _  [0.87] [0.04] [0.01] [0.94]  
IO -0.13 -0.11 -0.09 -0.03 1.00 0.45 0.38 -0.06  
  [0.06] [0.11] [0.19] [0.63] _  [0.00] [0.00] [0.37]  
FOLLOW -0.01 0.00 -0.03 -0.19 0.47 1.00 0.30 0.04  
  [0.93] [0.99] [0.70] [0.01] [0.00] _  [0.00] [0.57]  
NOCEO -0.05 0.01 -0.05 -0.23 0.37 0.32 1.00 -0.10  
  [0.49] [0.89] [0.43] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] _  [0.16]  
FRSQ 0.02 0.11 0.10 0.03 -0.06 0.10 -0.09 1.00  
  [0.82] [0.10] [0.15] [0.66] [0.36] [0.15] [0.17] _   
 
This table presents Pearson (upper triangle) and Spearman (lower triangle) correlations for the full sample. ABRET6, ABRET9, and 
ABRET12 are characteristics-based buy-and-hold abnormal returns calculated over the six-, nine-, and 12-month periods using the 
method in Daniel et al. (1997) and adjusting for delistings as in Beaver et al. (2007).  PCT is the percentage of eligible options that 
were exchanged in the program as disclosed in the tender offer statement.  IO is the percentage of institutional holdings as of the most 
recent quarter ended prior to the exchange. FOLLOW is the natural logarithm of 1+ the maximum number of analysts following the 
firm during the year prior to the exchange year.  NOCEO equals 1 if the CEO is excluded from the exchange, and 0 otherwise.  FRSQ 





Characteristics-Based Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns  
and Exchange Participation – Full Sample 
 














      
Intercept 
 
1.58 ** 1.71 ** 1.93 ** 
  
 
[2.36]  [2.53]  [2.27]  
PCT 
- 
-1.42 * -1.82 ** -1.98 ** 
  
 
[-1.91]  [-2.32]  [-1.97]  
IO 
 
-1.95 ** -1.98 ** -2.73 * 
  
 
[-2.57]  [-2.41]  [-1.95]  
PCT_IO + 1.88 ** 2.06 ** 2.71 * 
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This table presents the three returns regressions for the full sample.  The dependent variable is 
characteristics-based buy-and-hold abnormal returns calculated over the six-, nine-, or 12-month 
period following exchange inception using the method in Daniel et al. (1997) and adjusting for 
delistings as in Beaver et al. (2007).  PCT is the percentage of eligible options that were 
exchanged in the program as disclosed in the tender offer statement.  IO is the percentage of 
institutional holdings as of the most recent quarter ended prior to the exchange.  FRSQ is the R2 
from a financial statement informativeness regression, computed as in Frankel and Li (2004).  
PCT_IO and PCT_FRSQ are interaction variables.  ***, **, and * represent significance at the 
.01, .05, and .10 levels (two-tailed) as measured using heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors 








Characteristics-Based Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns  
and Exchange Participation – CEO Inclusion Sample 
 














      
Intercept 
 
4.64 *** 4.39 *** 4.67 ** 
  
 
[3.14]  [3.28]  [2.59]  
PCT 
- 
-4.76 *** -4.94 *** -5.40 *** 
  
 
[-2.98]  [-3.32]  [-2.64]  
IO 
 
-2.82 ** -2.34 * -3.61  
  
 
[-2.28]  [-1.87]  [-1.62]  
PCT_IO + 2.95 ** 2.71 * 4.23 * 
  
 
[2.12]  [1.87]  [1.68]  
FRSQ 
 




[-1.91]  [-1.68]  [-0.78] 
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This table presents the three returns regressions for the sample of firms that include the CEO in 
the exchange.  The dependent variable is characteristics-based buy-and-hold abnormal returns 
calculated over the six-, nine-, or 12-month period following exchange inception using the 
method in Daniel et al. (1997) and adjusting for delistings as in Beaver et al. (2007). PCT is the 
percentage of eligible options that were exchanged in the program as disclosed in the tender offer 
statement.  IO is the percentage of institutional holdings as of the most recent quarter ended prior 
to the exchange.  FRSQ is the R2 from a financial statement informativeness regression, 
computed as in Frankel and Li (2004).  PCT_IO and PCT_FRSQ are interaction variables.  ***, 
**, and * represent significance at the .01, .05, and .10 levels (two-tailed) as measured using 








Characteristics-Based Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns  
and Exchange Participation – CEO Exclusion Sample 
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This table presents the three returns regressions for the sample of firms that exclude the CEO 
from the exchange.  The dependent variable is characteristics-based buy-and-hold abnormal 
returns calculated over the six-, nine-, or 12-month period following exchange inception using 
the method in Daniel et al. (1997) and adjusting for delistings as in Beaver et al. (2007). PCT is 
the percentage of eligible options that were exchanged in the program as disclosed in the tender 
offer statement.  IO is the percentage of institutional holdings as of the most recent quarter ended 
prior to the exchange.  FRSQ is the R2 from a financial statement informativeness regression, 
computed as in Frankel and Li (2004).  PCT_IO and PCT_FRSQ are interaction variables.  ***, 
**, and * represent significance at the .01, .05, and .10 levels (two-tailed) as measured using 







Characteristics-Based Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns  
and Exchange Participation – Alternative Specification 
 
















       
Intercept 
 
1.30 ** 1.40 ** 1.94 *   
  
 
[2.42]  [2.54]  [1.76]    
PCT 
- 
-1.18 * -1.32 ** -1.75    
  
 
[-1.96]  [-2.10]  [-1.43]    
IO 
 
-1.91 ** -1.96 ** -2.77 *   
  
 
[-2.54]  [-2.42]  [-1.83]    
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This table presents the three alternative returns regressions for the full sample.  The dependent 
variable is characteristics-based buy-and-hold abnormal returns calculated over the six-, nine-, or 
12-month period following exchange inception using the method in Daniel et al. (1997) and 
adjusting for delistings as in Beaver et al. (2007). PCT is the percentage of eligible options that 
were exchanged in the program as disclosed in the tender offer statement.  IO is the percentage 
of institutional holdings as of the most recent quarter ended prior to the exchange.  FOLLOW is 
the natural logarithm of 1+ the maximum number of analysts following the firm during the year 
prior to the exchange year. PCT_IO and PCT_FOLLOW are interaction variables.  ***, **, and * 
represent significance at the .01, .05, and .10 levels (two-tailed) as measured using 







Characteristics-Based Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns  
and Exchange Participation – CEO Inclusion Sample  
 
Pure Vesting Extensions Excluded 
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69   69   69   
 
This table presents the three returns regressions for the sample of exchanges that both include the 
CEO and exclude pure vesting extensions.  The dependent variable is characteristics-based buy-
and-hold abnormal returns calculated over the six-, nine-, or 12-month period following 
exchange inception using the method in Daniel et al. (1997) and adjusting for delistings as in 
Beaver et al. (2007). PCT is the percentage of eligible options that were exchanged in the 
program as disclosed in the tender offer statement.  IO is the percentage of institutional holdings 
as of the most recent quarter ended prior to the exchange.  FRSQ is the R2 from a financial 
statement informativeness regression, computed as in Frankel and Li (2004).  PCT_IO and 
PCT_FRSQ are interaction variables.  ***, **, and * represent significance at the .01, .05, and 
.10 levels (two-tailed) as measured using heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors (t-statistics 





Characteristics-Based Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns  
and Exchange Participation – CEO Inclusion Sample  
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44   44   44   
 
This table presents the three returns regressions for the sample of non-value-for-value exchanges 
that include the CEO.  The dependent variable is characteristics-based buy-and-hold abnormal 
returns calculated over the six-, nine-, or 12-month period following exchange inception using 
the method in Daniel et al. (1997) and adjusting for delistings as in Beaver et al. (2007). PCT is 
the percentage of eligible options that were exchanged in the program as disclosed in the tender 
offer statement.  IO is the percentage of institutional holdings as of the most recent quarter ended 
prior to the exchange.  FRSQ is the R2 from a financial statement informativeness regression, 
computed as in Frankel and Li (2004).  PCT_IO and PCT_FRSQ are interaction variables.  ***, 
**, and * represent significance at the .01, .05, and .10 levels (two-tailed) as measured using 






Characteristics-Based Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns  
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49   49   49   
 
This table presents the three returns regressions for the sample of value-for-value exchanges that 
include the CEO.  The dependent variable is characteristics-based buy-and-hold abnormal returns 
calculated over the six-, nine-, or 12-month period following exchange inception using the 
method in Daniel et al. (1997) and adjusting for delistings as in Beaver et al. (2007). PCT is the 
percentage of eligible options that were exchanged in the program as disclosed in the tender offer 
statement.  IO is the percentage of institutional holdings as of the most recent quarter ended prior 
to the exchange.  FRSQ is the R2 from a financial statement informativeness regression, 
computed as in Frankel and Li (2004).  PCT_IO and PCT_FRSQ are interaction variables.  ***, 
**, and * represent significance at the .01, .05, and .10 levels (two-tailed) as measured using 





Panel A: Short-Window Returns around the Participation Disclosure Date 
 
  (-1,1)   (-1,5)   (-1,10) 










N 197   197   197 
 
 
This table presents short-window mean cumulative abnormal returns around the participation 
disclosure date for uncontaminated participation disclosure events.  ***, **, and * represent 
significance at the .01, .05, and .10 levels, respectively. 
 
 
Panel B: Short-Window Returns around the Participation Disclosure Date for Low and 
High Participation Exchanges 
 
 
(-1,1) (-1,5) (-1,10) 
 
Low High Low High Low High 
Mean CAR -1.08% 0.60% -1.48% 2.34% -0.12% 2.40% 
F test/p-value   7.53*** 
 




N 99 98 99 98 99 98 
 
This table presents short-window mean cumulative abnormal returns around the disclosure date 
for uncontaminated participation disclosure events, partitioned into two groups using the median 
value of the participation rate.  The F-statistic tests the null hypothesis that the standardized 
mean abnormal returns of the high and low groups are equal.    ***, **, and * represent 






Short-Window Cumulative Abnormal Returns  
and Exchange Participation—Full Sample 
 




   
  
Intercept -0.17 *** -0.16 
 
-0.08   
   [-2.38]  [-1.52] 
 
 [-0.75]   
PCT 0.22 ** 0.25 * 0.14   
  [2.15] [1.87] 
 
[1.10]   
IO 0.08 0.08 
 
-0.12   
  [0.73] [0.53] 
 
 [-0.82]   
PCT_IO -0.09 -0.13 
 
0.09   
   [-0.71]  [-0.71] 
 
[0.50]   
FRSQ 0.13 ** 0.05 
 
0.19 *  
  [1.99] [0.52] 
 
[1.73]   




  [-2.11]  [-0.86] 
 











0.04   
N 177   177   177   
 
This table presents three short-window returns regressions for the full sample of uncontaminated 
exchange events.  The dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal return over the (-1,1), (-
1,5) and (-1,10) windows as computed using the Fama-French three factor model with 
momentum (Carhart 1997). PCT is the percentage of eligible options that were exchanged in the 
program as disclosed in the tender offer statement.  IO is the percentage of institutional holdings 
as of the most recent quarter ended prior to the exchange.  FRSQ is the R2 from a financial 
statement informativeness regression, computed as in Frankel and Li (2004).  PCT_IO and 
PCT_FRSQ are interaction variables.  ***, **, and * represent significance at the .01, .05, and 
.10 levels (two-tailed) as measured using heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors (t-statistics 






Short-Window Cumulative Abnormal Returns  
and Exchange Participation—CEO Inclusion Sample 
 












0.08   
   [-1.39]  [-1.41] [0.40]   
PCT 0.24 0.35 -0.05   
  [1.36] [1.55]  [-0.22]   
IO 0.31 ** 0.35 -0.08   
  [2.40] [1.34]  [-0.28]   
PCT_IO -0.33 ** -0.40 0.09   
   [-2.03]  [-1.25] [0.25]   
FRSQ -0.08 -0.01 -0.13   
   [-0.37]  [-0.03]  [-0.44]   
PCT_FRSQ -0.01 -0.05 0.11   












0.01   
N 73   73   73   
 
This table presents three short-window returns regressions for the sample of uncontaminated 
events for which the CEO was included in the exchange.  The dependent variable is the 
cumulative abnormal return over the (-1,1), (-1,5) and (-1,10) windows as computed using the 
Fama-French three factor model with momentum (Carhart 1997). PCT is the percentage of 
eligible options that were exchanged in the program as disclosed in the tender offer statement.  
IO is the percentage of institutional holdings as of the most recent quarter ended prior to the 
exchange.  FRSQ is the R2 from a financial statement informativeness regression, computed as in 
Frankel and Li (2004).  PCT_IO and PCT_FRSQ are interaction variables.  ***, **, and * 
represent significance at the .01, .05, and .10 levels (two-tailed) as measured using 








Short-Window Cumulative Abnormal Returns  
and Exchange Participation—CEO Exclusion Sample 
 
  (-1, 1)   (-1, 5)   (-1, 10)   
  
     
  
Intercept -0.19 * -0.16 
 
-0.29 ** 






  [1.89] [1.91] [2.97]   
IO 0.09 0.07 0.10   
  [0.60] [0.46] [0.69]   
PCT_IO -0.19 -0.21 -0.30 
 
   [-0.91]  [-1.00]  [-1.46]   
FRSQ 0.11 
* 
0.02 0.30 *** 
  [1.70] [0.24] [2.77]   
PCT_FRSQ -0.12 -0.06 -0.37 *** 












0.16   
N 104   104   104   
 
This table presents three short-window returns regressions for the sample of uncontaminated 
events for which the CEO was excluded from the exchange.  The dependent variable is the 
cumulative abnormal return over the (-1,1), (-1,5) and (-1,10) windows as computed using the 
Fama-French three factor model with momentum (Carhart 1997). PCT is the percentage of 
eligible options that were exchanged in the program as disclosed in the tender offer statement.  
IO is the percentage of institutional holdings as of the most recent quarter ended prior to the 
exchange.  FRSQ is the R2 from a financial statement informativeness regression, computed as in 
Frankel and Li (2004).  PCT_IO and PCT_FRSQ are interaction variables.  ***, **, and * 
represent significance at the .01, .05, and .10 levels (two-tailed) as measured using 






Changes in Future Operating Earnings  
and Cash Flows—Full Sample 
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0.092 * 0.142   




[1.71] [1.37]   
PCT -0.140 ** -0.191 ** -0.089 
 
-0.236 * 
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LAG_DEP -0.386 
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0.27   
N 223   205   227   208   
 
This table presents regressions that model changes in operating earnings and operating cash 
flows one and two years forward.  The dependent variable is the change in annual operating 
income before depreciation (cash flow from operating activities) one or two years after the 
current year, scaled by total assets at year end. PCT is the percentage of eligible options that 
were exchanged in the program as disclosed in the tender offer statement.  LAG_DEP is the first 
lag of the change in operating earnings (operating cash flow) scaled by assets (measured from 
the prior year to the current year).  ASSETS is the natural logarithm of total assets.  BTM is the 
book to market ratio.  ***, **, and * represent significance at the .01, .05, and .10 levels (two-






Changes in Future Operating Earnings  
and Cash Flows—CEO Inclusion Sample 
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PCT -0.216 * -0.308 * -0.150 
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0.34   
N 96   85   96   85   
 
This table presents regressions that model changes in operating earnings and operating cash 
flows one and two years forward for the sample of firms that include the CEO in the exchange.  
The dependent variable is the change in annual operating income before depreciation (cash flow 
from operating activities) one or two years after the current year, scaled by total assets at year 
end. PCT is the percentage of eligible options that were exchanged in the program as disclosed in 
the tender offer statement.  LAG_DEP is the first lag of the change in operating earnings 
(operating cash flow) scaled by assets (measured from the prior year to the current year).  
ASSETS is the natural logarithm of total assets.  BTM is the book to market ratio.  ***, **, and * 
represent significance at the .01, .05, and .10 levels (two-tailed) as measured using 





Changes in Future Operating Earnings  
and Cash Flows—CEO Exclusion Sample 
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Intercept 0.167 *** 0.150 *** 0.083 ** 0.062   
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 [-0.24]   
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-0.270 * -0.382 *** -0.404 *** 
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0.16   
N 128   121   132   124   
 
This table presents regressions that model changes in operating earnings and operating cash 
flows one and two years forward for the sample of firms that exclude the CEO from the 
exchange.  The dependent variable is the change in annual operating income before depreciation 
(cash flow from operating activities) one or two years after the current year, scaled by total assets 
at year end. PCT is the percentage of eligible options that were exchanged in the program as 
disclosed in the tender offer statement.  LAG_DEP is the first lag of the change in operating 
earnings (operating cash flow) scaled by assets (measured from the prior year to the current 
year).  ASSETS is the natural logarithm of total assets.  BTM is the book to market ratio.  ***, **, 
and * represent significance at the .01, .05, and .10 levels (two-tailed) as measured using 










Examples of an Employee Stock Option Exchange Web Portal 
 
Source: SEC Form SC TO-I, EX-99.(A)(1)(G),”Screen Shots of the Offer Website” filed by NetApp, Inc. on May 22, 2009 
 
A. Online Election Form 
 
 
B. Online Breakeven Calculator 
 
 
 
 
 
 
